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Articles
Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in
Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis
and a Proposal for Reform
Jill E. Fisch,* Sean J. Griffith** & Steven Davidoff
Solomon***
Shareholder litigation challenging corporate mergers is ubiquitous, with
the likelihood of a shareholder suit exceeding 90%. The value of this litigation,
however, is questionable. The vast majority of merger cases settle for nothing
more than supplemental disclosures in the merger proxy statement. The
attorneys that bring these lawsuits are compensated for their efforts with a
court-awarded fee. This leads critics to charge that merger litigation benefits
only the lawyers who bring the claims, not the shareholders they represent. In
response, defenders of merger litigation argue that the lawsuits serve a useful
oversight function and that the improved disclosures that result are beneficial
to shareholders.
This Article offers a new approach to assessing the value of these claims
by empirically testing the relationship between merger litigation and
shareholder voting on the merger. If the supplemental disclosures produced by
the settlement of merger litigation are valuable, they should affect shareholder
voting behavior. Specifically, supplemental disclosures that are, in effect,
"compelled" by settlement should produce new and unfavorable information
about the merger and lead to a lower percentage of shares voted in favor of it.
Applying this hypothesis to a hand-collected sample of 453 large public
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company mergers from 2005 to 2012, we find no such effect. We find no
significant evidence that disclosure-only settlements affect shareholder voting.
These findings warrant a reconsideration of Delaware merger law.
Specifically, under current law, supplemental disclosures are viewed by courts
as providing a substantial benefit to the shareholder class. In turn, this
substantial benefit entitles the plaintiffs' lawyers to an award of attorneys 'fees.
Our evidence suggests that this legal analysis is misguided and that
supplemental disclosures do not in fact constitute a substantial benefit. As a
result, and in light of the substantial costs generated by public-company
merger litigation, we argue that courts should reject disclosure settlements as a
basis for attorneys 'fee awards.
Our approach responds to critiques of merger litigation as excessive and
frivolous by reducing the incentive for plaintiffs' lawyers to bring weak cases,
but it would have an additional benefit. Current practice drags state court
judges into the task of indirectly promulgating disclosure standards in
connection with the approval of fee awards. We argue, instead, for a more
efficient specialization between state and federal courts in the regulation of
mergers: public company merger disclosure should be policed by the federal
securities laws while state corporate law focuses on substantive fairness.
It is a fact evident to all of those who are familiar with shareholder
litigation that surviving a motion to dismiss means, as a practical
matter, that economical rational defendants... will settle such
claims, often for a peppercorn and a fee.
1
-- Chancellor William T. Allen in Solomon v. Pathe
Introduction
Deal litigation is pervasive in the United States. Multiple teams of
plaintiffs file lawsuits challenging virtually every public company merger,2
often in multiple jurisdictions.3 Moreover, the frequency of merger
litigation has risen sharply over the last several years.4 In 2012, 93% of
1. Solomon v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., No. CIV. A. 12563, 1995 WL 250374, at *4 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 21, 1995) (footnote omitted).
2. Both our empirical analysis and the policy proposals in this Article are limited to mergers
that involve publicly traded target companies. We do not address the role of litigation in policing
mergers involving private companies.
3. See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
4. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State
Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 469 (2015) (reporting that although only
39.3% of transactions incurred litigation in 2005, the frequency of litigation had risen to 92.1% by
2011).
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deals over $100 million and 96% of deals over $500 million were
challenged in shareholder litigation.5 In 2013, the frequency was even
higher-97.5% of deals over $100 million were challenged through
litigation, and each transaction triggered an average of seven separate
lawsuits.6
Although deal litigation is pervasive, these lawsuits rarely result in a
monetary recovery for the plaintiff class. Rather, the vast majority end in
settlement or dismissal. In most settled cases, the only relief provided to
shareholders consists of supplemental disclosures in the merger proxy
statement.7  In compensation for the benefit produced by these
settlements-often worth no more, in the words of a famous jurist, than a
"peppercom"-plaintiffs' attorneys receive a fee award.8
The dynamic, in which every deal is challenged but only the lawyers
get paid, has led to widespread skepticism concerning the value of public
company merger litigation among both academic and professional com-
mentators. 9 The view underlying much of this skepticism is that litigation
5. ROBERT M. DAINES & OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SHAREHOLDER
LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 1 & fig.1 (2013), available at
http://comrnerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Shareholder-Litigation-nvolving-Mergers-and-
Acqui, archived at http://perma.cc/TRL8-QNTK?type=pdf, see also Matthew D. Cain & Steven
M. Davidoff, Takeover Litigation in 2012, at 1-2 & tbl.A (Feb. 1, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=2216727, archived at http://perma.cc/X8HD-
PLHC (finding approximately 92% of deals over $100 million resulted in merger litigation in
2012).
6. Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Takeover Litigation in 2013, at 1-2 & tbl.A
(Moritz Coll. of Law Ctr. for Interdisciplinary Law & Policy Studies, Public Law & Legal Theory
Working Paper Series No. 236, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2377001, archived at
http://perma.cc/XP2B-8C8B.
7. See DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 5, at 6 fig.7 (finding that shareholders received only
supplemental disclosures in 75%-88% of settlements between 2009 to 2012); Cain & Davidoff,
supra note 5, at 4 (finding that disclosure-only settlements accounted for over 80% of all
settlements in 2012); Ann Woolner et al., When Merger Suits Enrich Only Lawyers, BLOOMBERG
(Feb. 16, 2012, 12:59 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-16/lawyers-cash-in-while-
investor-clients-get-nothing-in-merger-lawsuit-deals.html, archived at http://perma.cc/32HY-
A22M (reporting that 70% of merger lawsuits in Delaware during 2010 and 2011 made money for
plaintiffs' attorneys but not their clients). The supplemental disclosure may be a part of the target
company's proxy statement or prospectus or, in some cases, the target's Schedule 14D-9. For
brevity, we will refer to all of these collectively as the "proxy."
8. Solomon v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., No. CIV. A. 12563, 1995 WL 250374, at *4 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 21, 1995).
9. See, e.g., JOEL C. HAIMS & JAMES J. BEHA, I, RECENT DECISIONS SHOW COURTS
CLOSELY SCRUTINIZING FEE AWARDS IN M&A LITIGATION SETTLEMENTS 1 (2013) (noting that
shareholder suits follow virtually every major merger announcement and the payment of
attorneys' fees has essentially become a tax on significant mergers and acquisitions), available at
http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/l30418-In-the-courts.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc
/9NBW-VL2S; Phillip R. Sumpter, Adjusting Attorneys' Fee Awards: The Delaware Court of
Chancery's Answer to Incentivizing Meritorious Disclosure-Only Settlements, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
669, 688-91 (2013) (describing four types of criticism the Chancery Court has expressed); David
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that returns no monetary recovery to the plaintiff class must be without
merit.10  Equating merit and monetary recovery, however, implicitly
dismisses the value of nonpecuniary relief. Such nonpecuniary relief may
be valuable to shareholders, but it is hard to determine its value.
Importantly, Delaware law explicitly recognizes the potential value of
nonpecuniary relief in its litigation incentive structure. Delaware courts
award legal fees to plaintiffs' attorneys on the basis of lawsuits that provide
nonpecuniary relief to the plaintiff class as long as that relief constitutes a
corporate benefit. 1 Nevertheless, Delaware courts recognize that the value
of nonpecuniary benefits is difficult to quantify. Courts refer to the value of
amendments and supplemental disclosures as "qualitative" and "intan-
gible," meaning, essentially, that they cannot be measured.12 Without a
metric for-the value of nonpecuniary relief, it is difficult to determine the
utility of the litigation and, in particular, to determine the extent to which
courts, by awarding fees, should encourage the pursuit of litigation that
tends to result in nonpecuniary settlements.
13
In this Article, we offer a way out of the impasse. We propose that the
value of nonpecuniary relief in merger settlements be measured by its effect
on shareholder voting. Because nonpecuniary relief takes three basic forms
in the context of merger litigation-settlements that amend the terms of the
merger (amendment settlements); settlements that provide only supple-
mental disclosures (disclosure-only settlements); and settlements which
provide for an increase in the merger consideration (consideration-increase
settlements)-we separate each and test their effect on how shareholders
H. Webber, Private Policing of Mergers and Acquisitions: An Empirical Assessment of
Institutional Lead Plaintiffs in Transactional Class and Derivative Action, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L.
907, 909-10 (2014) (exploring the debate among commentators about the utility of merger
litigation); Robert M. Daines & Olga Koumrian, Merger Lawsuits Yield High Costs and
Questionable Benefits, DEALBOOK, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2012, 10:38 AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/08/merger-lawsuits-yield-high-costs-and-questionable-
benefits/, archived at http://perma.cc/8V7J-2B6Z (stating that deal litigation may "impose
excessive costs on the companies involved and their shareholders" while delivering uncertain
benefits).
10. E.g., Browning Jeffries, The Plaintiffs' Lawyer's Transaction Tax: The New Cost of
Doing Business in Public Company Deals, 11 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 55, 56-59 (2014).
11. Delaware law provides that the court may award plaintiffs' counsel a fee, payable by the
corporate defendant, when the litigation produces a benefit to the corporation and its shareholders.
Sugarland Indus., Inc. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142, 147 (Del. 1980).
12. In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. S'holders Litig., 65 A.3d 1116, 1136 (Del. Ch. 2011).
13. See, e.g., Transcript of Settlement Hearing and Rulings of the Court at 44, In re Gen-
Probe S'holders Litig., No. 7495-VCL (Del. Ch. Apr. 10, 2013) [hereinafter Gen-Probe
Transcript] ("I recognize that the policy is to encourage stockholder champions to bring
meritorious litigation but not to confer unwholesome windfalls that result in excessive and
unwarranted lawsuits.").
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vote on the deal.' 4 Our core hypotheses are as follows: First, because
amendments should improve the terms of the merger or the quality of the
procedures used in reaching a final agreement, amendment settlements
should increase shareholder voting in favor of the merger. In contrast,
because forced disclosures should produce negative information about the
merger, we hypothesize that disclosure-only settlements should decrease
shareholder voting in favor of the merger.
Our empirical tests draw upon a hand-collected sample of 453 mergers
involving publicly traded target companies announced from 2005 and
completed through 2012 along with proxy-voting statistics provided to us
by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) over the same period. Although
in theory it would be best to test the effect of nonpecuniary relief by
comparing shareholder votes before and after the settlement, such a
comparison is not possible because shareholder votes are tallied only once,
when the polls are closed at the meeting to approve the merger agreement.
As a result, our tests take the form of regressions. Our regression analyses
compare votes cast in cases involving amendment settlements and
disclosure-only settlements to votes in other mergers.
Our tests yield two main empirical results. First, we find weak support
for our first hypothesis-that is, that amendment settlements increase
shareholder voting in favor of a transaction. Second, and more importantly,
we find no support for the second hypothesis-that is, disclosure-only
settlements do not appear to affect shareholder voting in any way. We also
find only weak evidence that consideration-increase settlements increase
shareholder voting in favor of a transaction. To gauge the significance of
our findings, we also tested the effect of several other variables on
shareholder voting, including transaction size and premium paid, the proxy
advisors' recommendation and institutional ownership, and the jurisdiction
of settlement. We find that transaction value and the proxy advisors'
recommendation have a significant effect on shareholder voting; the other
variables do not.
The implication of these findings is clear. If disclosure settlements do
not affect shareholder voting, it is difficult to argue that they benefit
shareholders. Accordingly, the basis upon which courts are awarding fees
to plaintiffs' counsel disappears. Moreover, the illusory benefit of
supplemental disclosure must be weighed against the clear cost of merger
litigation-including litigation expense as well as delay and uncertainty.
Accordingly, our Article proposes that the Delaware courts stop awarding
fees for disclosure-only settlements. This reform would reduce the
14. Some settlements provide for a combination of relief. We treat settlements that both
amend the merger agreement and provide supplemental disclosures as "amendment settlements."
See infra note 137.
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incentive for plaintiffs' attorneys to bring weak merger cases. To the extent
that merger disclosures are meaningfully deficient, we argue that plaintiffs
should be required to litigate challenges to disclosure quality under the
federal securities laws. This would have the effect of efficiently
specializing litigation challenges while reducing plaintiffs' counsels' ability
to use disclosure as a negotiating point to justify a fee award.
We also argue that state court merger litigation has had the perverse
effect of creating a substantive state law of disclosure that is litigated
almost exclusively within the artificial context of settlement approval rather
than in truly adversarial proceedings. This state law exists within the
shadow of federal regulation of mergers, which imposes extensive and
explicit disclosure obligations on publicly traded companies. We suggest
that the duplication is unnecessary and problematic. Specifically, federal
law is expressly tailored to achieving an appropriate balance in disclosure
requirements and addressing disclosure deficiencies that are substantially
likely to influence the voting decision-that is, material misrepresentations
or omissions. In contrast, Delaware law creates an incentive for litigants to
generate, and judges to reward, throwaway disclosures that are designed
simply to end litigation and generate a release. 15 These settlements produce
disclosures that do not matter to shareholders but are instead simply "useful
gravy.
16
Our recommendation would restore merger litigation to the balance
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Santa Fe v. Green. 7 In
Santa Fe v. Green, the Court limited the federal securities law cause of
action to challenges to disclosure quality, holding that challenges to the
adequacy of the merger consideration should be litigated under state law.'8
We argue that the Delaware courts should reach a similar result-a type of
consensual preemption-by concluding that claims about the adequacy of
merger disclosure should be litigated under federal law and subject to the
materiality threshold and other procedural requirements associated with
federal litigation. This efficient specialization would leave for state law
issues concerning the fairness of the merger terms.
This Article fits within the body of scholarly literature on
representative litigation generally and shareholder litigation in particular.1 9
15. See Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Merger
Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REv. 1053, 1065 (2013) (describing this dynamic).
16. Gen-Probe Transcript, supra note 13, at 27.
17. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
18. Id. at 479-80.
19. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications for
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 669, 669, 677 (1986) (characterizing plaintiffs' lawyers in representative
litigation as "private attorneys general" and theorizing that the litigation and settlement patterns
[Vol. 93:557
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This literature has frequently questioned the extent to which representative
litigation produces meaningful value for plaintiffs. 20  Although many
articles criticize merger litigation, to our knowledge none supports its
conclusion with empirical evidence on the relationship between merger
litigation and shareholder voting.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. In Part I we
describe the dynamics of merger litigation and note, in particular, the role
that courts have played in encouraging litigation challenges through the
terms on which they approve settlements and fee awards. Part I explicitly
identifies the motivation for our empirical tests: the assumption that these
settlements provide a benefit to plaintiff shareholders. In Part II we report
our empirical results. Most significantly, we find that amendment
settlements affect shareholder voting but that disclosure settlements do not.
In Part III we consider the public policy implications of our findings.
Part IV identifies and responds to possible objections to our proposa, and in
Part V, we briefly sketch out possible methods for implementation. We
conclude that Delaware courts should abandon the practice of compensating
plaintiffs' lawyers for disclosure-only settlements.
I. Merger Litigation and Disclosure-Only Settlements
A. The Anatomy of a Merger Claim
State court merger litigation is premised upon the traditional fiduciary
duties that target-company officers and directors owe to the company's
shareholders 2 1 in connection with an acquisition, merger, or other business
will reflect their private incentives). Much empirical work on shareholder litigation is devoted to
securities fraud class actions. E.g., Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57
VAND. L. REV. 1465 (2004); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Mapping the American
Shareholder Litigation Experience: A Survey of Empirical Studies of the Enforcement of the U.S.
Securities Law, 6 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 164 (2009).
20. See, e.g., Steven B. Hantler & Robert E. Norton, Coupon Settlements: The Emperor's
Clothes of Class Actions, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1343, 1347-48 (2005) (describing coupon
settlements of dubious value including one where attorneys received $1.75 million and consumers
received a free box of Cheerios if they kept the original grocery receipt to prove purchase);
Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55,
84 85 (1991) (concluding that "shareholder litigation is a weak, if not ineffective, instrument of
corporate governance"); Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How
Delaware Law (Mis)Shapes Shareholder Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1822, 1855-56
(2004) (examining 104 merger class actions filed in Delaware between 1999 to 2001 and finding
that merger litigation is lawyer driven, resulting in opportunistic filing and settlement of claims).
2 1. Although the shareholders of both target and acquiring companies may be unhappy about
a planned merger, target shareholders are the typical plaintiffs in merger litigation. In part, this is
because target-company shareholders can typically bring a direct action, while the acquirer's
shareholders can only bring a derivative suit in the name of the corporation, which is subject to a
variety of procedural limitations. Notably, Delaware law has imposed distinctive duties on target-
company boards in the merger context. See Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc.,
2015]
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combination.22 In recent years this type of claim has proliferated.23 State
law fiduciary duties encompass several types of claims. In friendly deals,24
the typical claims are a breach of the duty of care and a failure to act in
good faith, based on allegations that the board failed to work diligently to
maximize the merger price.2 5  The transaction may also trigger a related
Revlon 26 claim. Claims in the context of a controlling shareholder add more
traditional allegations of duty-of-loyalty violations.27 Finally, shareholders
28can allege violations of the board's state law duty of disclosure.
The Delaware courts developed the scope of directors' state law
disclosure obligations fairly recently. 29 Although the courts have long
637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1994) (requiring enhanced scrutiny in a stock transaction in which the target
company went from being diffusely held to coming under the influence of a controlling
shareholder); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 181-84 (Del.
1986) (proscribing enhanced scrutiny in a cash transaction involving a break up of the target
company); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711-15 (Del. 1983) (requiring fair dealing
and fair price in non-arm's length transactions). But see J. Travis Laster, Revlon is a Standard of
Review: Why It's True and What It Means, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 5, 7 (2013)
(criticizing the so-called "Paramount doctrine" and seeking to articulate a new basis for enhanced
scrutiny).
22. For the sake of brevity, we refer to all of these transactions collectively as "mergers."
23. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
24. Our analysis does not focus on hostile litigation, which raises independent bases for
litigation. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953-54 (Del. 1985)
(articulating the legal principles applicable in a challenge to a board's adoption of defensive
measures initiated in response to a takeover attempt).
25. See, e.g., Robert Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder
Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REv. 133, 143, 145-47 (2004).
26. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
27. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 25, at 196.
28. A target board has a disclosure obligation under Delaware law that stems both from the
statute and from the board's fiduciary duty. See In re Primedia, Inc. S'holders Litig., 67 A.3d
455, 495 (Del. Ch. 2013) (distinguishing "the statutory obligation to maintain a current and candid
merger recommendation ... and the fiduciary duty to disclose material information when seeking
stockholder action"). The statutory duty to disclose in connection with merger transactions arises
from the requirement that the board make a recommendation concerning the advisability of an
intended merger transaction to the shareholders entitled to vote thereon. See DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 25 1(b) (2011) (requiring that the board adopt the agreement and declare its advisability
prior to the shareholder vote). See generally Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch
Mob: The Corporate Director's Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REv. 1087, 1163 (1996)
(describing the fiduciary duty of disclosure as "an obligation to use reasonable care in presenting a
recommendation for stockholder action and in gathering and disseminating corporate information
in connection with that recommendation"). Because shareholders cannot act without information,
courts have interpreted the statute to require that the board "disclose fully and fairly all material
information within the board's control when it seeks shareholder action." Stroud v. Grace, 606
A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992).
29. It is likely that the source is the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Stroud v. Grace.
See Hamermesh, supra note 28, at 1089-91 (describing the development of the duty of disclosure
under Delaware corporation law following Stroud). Seeds of a broader disclosure duty under
Delaware law appear much earlier. For example, Elliott Weiss and Lawrence White characterize
the Court's decision in Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977), as moving
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recognized that the board in a merger is responsible for providing
shareholders with sufficient information to approve or reject the transaction
on an informed basis,3° the suggestion that directors have an independent
duty of disclosure and that directors can breach that duty by failing to
provide shareholders with information material to the vote is of recent
31vintage.
Plaintiffs in merger litigation typically ask for equitable relief-most
often in the form of an injunction barring consummation of the transaction
or requiring a substantial revision of its terms, such as a higher price.32 The
suits are filed during the pendency of the transaction-usually within days
of the public announcement of the merger.33 Most of the litigation effort,
motions practice, and expedited discovery takes place during the relatively
brief window between the merger filing and its closing.34 Because claims
that are not resolved on motions or settled prior to closing can theoretically
be litigated long after closing, creating a potentially significant contingent
liability, defendants have a strong incentive to resolve merger claims before
"Delaware law from a posture of requiring less disclosure than federal law requires to a posture of
requiring more." Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, Of Econometrics and Indeterminacy. A
Study of Investors' Reactions to "Changes" in Corporate Law, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 551, 572
(1987).
30. The seminal case for this proposition is Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985),
which held that a board had breached its fiduciary duty by failing to disclose the parameters of the
negotiations leading to the company's sale. Id. at 890-92.
31. Delaware's focus on disclosure can be traced to a series of recent cases that required
enhanced disclosure in investment banker fairness analysis, as well as in private equity and other
conflicted interest transactions. See, e.g., In re Pure Res., Inc., S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421,
449-50 (Del. Ch. 2002) (requiring that a target disclose in a tender offer the underlying
information used in preparation of a fairness opinion received by its board). See generally
Lloyd L. Drury, III, Private Equity and the Heightened Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure, 6 N.Y.U.
J.L. & Bus. 33, 45-48 (2009) (discussing the heightened duty of disclosure employed in Delaware
private equity cases in recent years); Blake Rohrbacher & John Mark Zeberkiewicz, Fair
Summary: Delaware's Framework for Disclosing Fairness Opinions, 63 BUS. LAW. 881 (2008)
(explaining the duty of disclosure in Delaware law in general and specifically addressing how the
duty affects fairness opinions).
32. See, e.g., Verified Amended Class Action Complaint for Breach of Fiduciary Duty at 27,
Schacher v. Clausen, No. 8396-VCL (Del. Ch. Mar. 21, 2013) [hereinafter Sauer-Danjbss
Complaint] (seeking to have the proposed merger permanently enjoined).
33. See, e.g., In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. S'holders Litig., 65 A.3d 1116, 1119 (Del. Ch. 2011)
(noting that plaintiffs filed their complaint challenging the merger "hours after" the merger plan
was announced); DAINES & KOUMRAIN, supra note 5, at 1 (explaining that, for lawsuits filed in
2012, "[t]hese lawsuits were filed an average of 14 days after the merger announcement, with
plaintiff firms sometimes announcing investigations within hours of the merger announcement").
34. WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & DORR LLP, 2013 M&A REPORT 17 (2013),
available at http://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/WilmerHaleShared_Content/Files/Edito
rial/Publication/2013-wilmerhale-ma-report.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/EN4X-4DGK
("Discovery in these cases can be very fast paced and compressed, since plaintiffs will seek
expedited discovery before the shareholder vote on the transaction.").
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the merger closes.35 Empirical studies confirm these incentives, finding that
nearly 70% of merger claims settle while the rest are dismissed.16 The vast
majority of the settlements are concluded prior to the closing of the
underlying transaction. 7
Although the complaints in merger cases typically allege that the
merger is substantively unfair,38 few cases result in any monetary recovery
for the plaintiff class. 39  Some suits result in amendments to the merger
agreement, often to the transaction's deal-protection provisions. 40 The vast
majority of suits, however, settle exclusively for supplemental disclosure in
the form of additional information in the merger proxy statement. 4! The
specific disclosures can vary-they may include details of the negotiating
process, the manner in which the investment bankers are being
compensated in connection with the deal, or specifics about the manner in
which the deal or the target company has been valued, either by the board
or its advisers.42 The supplemental disclosures are provided in an amended
proxy statement (Schedule 14A) and are generally disclosed in an 8-K
report as well.43 Commentators typically refer to such settlements, when
35. For an example of a merger case that resulted in a $1.347 billion damage award six years
after the deal closed, see In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S'holder Derivative Litig., 52 A.3d 761, 766,
819 (Del. Ch. 2011).
36. E.g., Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 477.
37. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION
INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 9 (2012) [hereinafter RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION].
38. See, e.g., Sauer-Danfoss Complaint, supra note 32, at para. 76, at 24 (alleging that, as a
result of defendants' breach of fiduciary duty, plaintiffs "have not and will not receive their fair
portion of the value of Sauer-Danfoss's assets and will be deprived of a fair process").
39. DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 5, at 6 fig.7. In a small number of cases, however,
merger litigation can result in substantial damage awards. For example, in 2012, two cases were
settled for large money damages-S 110 million in the deal between El Paso and Kinder Morgan
and $49 million in the acquisition of Delphi Financial Group, Inc. by Tokio Marine Holdings, Inc.
Id. at6.
40. See Griffith & Lahav, supra note 15, at 1093 ("A small number of settlements
(approximately thirteen percent) resulted in changes to the merger agreement, most often to the
deal-protection provisions .... "). Nondisclosure settlements declined to only 12.5% of
settlements in 2012. Cain & Davidoff, supra note 5, at 4.
41. See DANES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 5, at 6 (observing that in 81% of merger cases filed
in 2012, the only product of the settlement was additional disclosure); Cain & Davidoff, supra
note 4, at 478 ("Settlements which only require disclosure constitute 55.1% of the settlement types
in the sample and are the most common type of settlement.").
42. See infra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Zygo Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 6, 2014), available at
http://yahoo.brand.edgar-online.com/displayfilinginfo.aspx?filingid= 1 0039268&tabindex=2&ty
pe=html, archived at http://perma.cc/Y8DT-DQU9 (disclosing additional information in
conjunction with settlement of merger lawsuit).
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they are not combined with some other form of relief, as "disclosure-only"
settlements aa a terminology that we will employ in this Article.
The practical explanation for disclosure-only settlements lies in the
financial structure of U.S. shareholder litigation. Although parties to
litigation normally must finance their own costs, shareholder suits-both
derivative suits and class actions-operate under a long-recognized
exception to this so-called "American Rule.'A5  Instead the courts have
determined that plaintiffs' lawyers in shareholder litigation can have their
fees paid directly by the defendant corporation if the litigation results in a
"corporate benefit. ' 4  The key to plaintiffs' counsel recovering fees is the
portrayal of the settlement relief as a corporate benefit.4 7 In a negotiated
settlement, defendants will typically not oppose this characterization, nor
will they oppose the sought-after fee award, an important element of the
bargain.a
Average fee awards for the settlement of merger litigation vary widely.
In Del Monte,4 9 plaintiffs' counsel received one of the largest fee awards-
$22.3 million for a case that generated a recovery to the plaintiff of $89.4
million.50 At the low end of the scale is the recent award of $100,000 in
Gen-Probe."l Given this wide range, reports of average fee awards can
easily be misleading. Because most cases settle for disclosure only,
however, focusing on disclosure settlements may provide a more realistic
view of the incentives under which most plaintiffs' attorneys are operating.
44. E.g., Sumpter, supra note 9, at 678.
45. In re Dunkin' Donuts S'holders Litig., No. 10825, 1990 WL 189120, at *3 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 27, 1990).
46. Id.; see also infra subpart I(C).
47. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. The corporate benefit doctrine is actually a
variant of earlier collective decisions awarding attorneys' fees out of a common fund in cases in
which the litigation produced a common fund for the benefit of the corporation or plaintiff class.
Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation by Shifting the
Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1, 37-41 (2015).
48. See In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. S'holders Litig., 65 A.3d 1116, 1137 (Del. Ch. 2011)
." [O]nce a settlement is agreed, the attorneys for the plaintiff stockholders link arms with their
former adversaries to defend the joint handiwork."' (quoting Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d
327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Griffith &
Lahav, supra note 15, at 1093 ("The approval process that courts follow in determining fees
awarded to class counsel is, in an important sense, nonadversarial."); Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation:
Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 46 (1991)
(describing settlement hearings as "pep rallies jointly orchestrated by plaintiffs' counsel and
defense counsel").
49. In re Del Monte Foods Co. S'holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813 (Del. Ch. 2011).
50. Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 57-58, Del Monte Foods, 25 A.3d 813 (No. 6027-
VCL) [hereinafter Del Monte Transcript].
51. In re Gen-Probe Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 7495-VCL, 2013 WL 1465619, at para. 9 (Del.
Ch. Apr. 10, 2013).
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In disclosure-only settlements, the average requested fee award has declined
over the past several years, from an average of $730,000 in 2009 to an
average of $540,000 in 2012.52 Studies show that the average fee awarded
in disclosure-only settlements is approximately $500,000. 53
B. Approving Settlement
Because of the representative nature of merger litigation, the
termination of a merger suit by voluntary dismissal or settlement requires
court approval.54 For most cases that are settled, the court's role at a
settlement hearing is threefold: the court must approve the certification of
the class; 55 the court must assess whether the settlement is fair and
reasonable; 56 and the court must decide on the amount of the fee to be
awarded to plaintiffs' counsel.57 While these steps are independent in
theory, as a practical matter, they often collapse. If the court determines
that the benefits provided by a settlement are illusory, the plaintiff class will
not have received any consideration for the releases that accompany a
settlement, and the settlement will not be seen as fair.58 In such a case, the
court might properly refuse to approve the settlement. This decision might,
however, raise questions about the adequacy with which the class has been
represented, suggesting that the court should deny class certification.59
Similarly, if the court approves the settlement, it has implicitly concluded
that the plaintiff class has received something of value, making it difficult
to decline to award a fee to class counsel. Notably, the judges in the
Delaware Chancery Court are conscious of the incentives that their
decisions create with respect to future litigation.60  As a result, their
52. DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 5, at 9 fig.9.
53. See, e.g., Cain & Davidoff, supra note 6, at 4 tbl.B (reporting the mean and median
attorneys' fees for disclosure-only settlements in 2013 as $511,000 and $485,000, respectively).
54. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (requiring judicial approval for dismissal or compromise of a
class action); accord DEL. CT. CH. R. 23(e).
55. At certification, the judge is charged with determining that the class meets the
requirements of the class action rule, including adequacy of representation and of class counsel.
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 618-20 (1997); see also In re Revlon, Inc.
S'holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 957 (Del. Ch. 2010) (finding counsel was inadequate and therefore
declining to approve settlement).
56. In re Triarc Cos., 791 A.2d 872, 876 (Del. Ch. 2001).
57. In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. S'holders Litig., 65 A.3d 1116, 1135 (Del. Ch. 2011); see also
infra subpart I(C).
58. The settlement agreement typically requires the plaintiffs to release all claims arising out
of the merger. Note how this precludes all related claims as a result of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. Griffith & Lahav, supra note 15, at 1058.
59. E.g., Transcript of Teleconference at 10-11, In re Transatlantic Holdings Inc. S'holders
Litig., No. 6574-CS (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2013) [hereinafter Transatlantic Holdings Transcript].
60. See, e.g., Sauer-Danfoss, 65 A.3d at 1136 (recognizing that consistency among opinions
promotes fairness by establishing baseline expectations).
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opinions frequently seek to benchmark their judgments about settlement
value and an appropriate fee level by reference to comparable cases. 6
In determining whether a proposed settlement is fair and reasonable,
the court attempts to weigh the consideration received by the plaintiff class
against the strength of the claims that are being released as part of the
settlement. As Chancellor Allen explained in Caremark,62 a motion seeking
judicial approval of a proposed settlement "requires the court to assess the
strengths and weaknesses of the claims asserted in light of the discovery
record and to evaluate the fairness and adequacy of the consideration
offered... in exchange for the release of all claims made or arising from
the facts alleged., 63 This is more easily said than done.
The courts' task in reviewing and approving settlements is complicated
by three factors. First, the settlement hearing is likely to be nonadversarial
in nature. Second, the factual record presented to the court will be
relatively undeveloped. Third, in the absence of an intervening bid, the
intended transaction will likely be highly beneficial to shareholders, causing
the judge to hesitate to throw additional obstacles in its path. With regard
to the nonadversarial nature of the hearing, both plaintiffs and defendants
will have a strong incentive to have their agreed-upon settlement approved
by the court. Hence, in the absence of objectors, information indicating that
the settlement is unfair or unreasonable will not be brought to the court's
attention. Second, at a settlement hearing, the court is reviewing a
stipulated statement of facts rather than hearing trial testimony or reviewing
other direct evidence. Counsel's development of the factual record through
discovery may be limited both because of the short window within which
merger litigation is conducted and because, once a settlement appears
likely, neither side wishes to expend unnecessary resources on additional
fact-finding.64 As a result, even without the potential for collusion inherent
in a nonadversarial proceeding, the court is likely to lack all information
necessary to evaluate the settlement. Moreover, the counterfactual analysis
required to evaluate the strength of plaintiffs' claims is generally
impractical. Third and finally, the court is in a difficult position since
experience shows that the vast majority of proposed mergers are approved
by shareholders, usually by an overwhelming vote, due to the premium
mergers provide shareholders over the current market price. Without an
61. See, e.g., id. (determining an appropriate fee award by comparing past fee awards granted
by the court in similar cases).
62. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del Ch. 1996).
63. Id. at 961.
64. See, e.g., In re Revlon, Inc. S'holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 945-46 (Del. Ch. 2010)
(describing a "kabuki dance" of deal litigation in which "real litigation activity... ceased" once
the litigation leadership structure is established).
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intervening bidder, the court is unlikely to throw additional obstacles in the
65way of a transaction that offers plain benefits to shareholders. As a result,
there is good reason to doubt the ability even of expert jurists to assess the
fairness and adequacy of settlements reliably in this context.
Despite these limitations, Delaware judges take seriously their
obligation to safeguard the interests of the class by reviewing settlement
quality. Evaluating a settlement that provides increased consideration or
damages to the plaintiffs is relatively straightforward. Amendment
settlements may benefit the shareholders by increasing the likelihood that a
third party will make a topping bid. Thus, in Compellent,66 Vice Chanceller
J. Travis Laster explained that the value of therapeutic changes to a merger
agreement "can be estimated as a function of the incremental amount that
stockholders would receive if a higher bid emerged times the probability of
the higher bid. ''67 The court went on to consider empirical data in order to
quantify the potential frequency and size of a topping bid.68
Disclosure-only settlements can benefit the shareholder class if the
required disclosures allow the shareholders to exercise their voting rights in
a more meaningful manner. In Sauer-Danfoss,69 for example, Vice
Chancellor Laster evaluated the eleven supplemental disclosures called for
by the settlement agreement and weighed the extent to which each provided
meaningful new information to shareholders. 70 He concluded that, of the
eleven, only one was material. 71 Similarly in PAETEC,72 Vice Chancellor
Sam Glasscock considered each individual disclosure required by the
proposed settlement and concluded that, except for one, each was of
doubtful materiality, trivial, or of marginal utility to shareholders.73
To the extent that a court finds a proposed settlement to be of dubious
value or, more problematically, inconsistent with its own assessment of the
strength of the case,74 the court may view the settlement as the product of
65. See, e.g., In re El Paso Corp. S'holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 449-51 (Del. Ch. 2012)
(noting the court's reluctance to enjoin merger, despite finding of unfair practices, where an
injunction might deprive the shareholders of an attractive opportunity to sell their stock).
66. In re Compellent Techs., Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 6084-VCL, 2011 WL 6382523 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 9, 2011).
67. Id. at *20.
68. Id. at *21-25.
69. In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. S'holders Litig., 65 A.3d 1116 (Del. Ch. 2011).
70. Id. at 1128-35.
71. Id. at 1128.
72. In re PAETEC Holding Corp. S'holders Litig., No. 6761-VCG, 2013 WL 1110811 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 19, 2013).
73. Id. at *6-8.
74. This determination might be assisted through the participation of objectors to the
settlement. See, e.g., Prezant v. De Angelis, 636 A.2d 915, 926 (Del. 1994) (remanding settlement
for more rigorous inquiry into inadequacy of representation based on objectors' appeal); Griffith
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collusion between plaintiffs' counsel and defense counsel.75 In Scully v.
Nighthawk,76 Vice Chancellor Laster appointed special counsel to inquire
into the possibility of collusion when the litigants concluded a disclosure-
only settlement in an alternative forum77 after the Vice Chancellor in an
earlier hearing had found no colorable disclosure claim but a potentially
serious process issue.78  The special counsel's brief defined the issue
narrowly, 79 ultimately concluding that collusion had not in fact occurred
because the Nighthawk settlement was broadly comparable to other cases.80
Although not framing his analysis in terms of collusion, Chancellor
Leo Strine expressed similar concerns in Transatlantic Holdings.81 Having
been asked to certify the plaintiffs' class, approve the settlement, and award
& Lahav, supra note 15, at 1084-86 (emphasizing the role of objectors in reinvigorating "the
adversarial process in an otherwise collusive environment"). The objection rate in class action
settlements is low, however. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and
Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1529,
1533-34 (2004); Jeffries, supra note 10, at 59.
75. The principal factors identified by commentators in identifying collusive settlement
practices-fees awarded on top of a settlement that involves limited bargaining and nonpecuniary
relief-are present in the settlement of virtually every merger claim. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey
& Geoffrey P. Miller, Judicial Review of Class Action Settlements, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 167,
191-92 (2009) (listing "yellow flags" for collusion, including "settlement bargaining limited to
one of the competing groups of plaintiffs' attorneys; settlement with the group of attorneys who
present a less substantial threat of carrying the case forward to trial ... [and] the award of
lucrative and potentially justified attorneys' fees").
76. Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology Holdings, Inc., No. 5890-VCL (Del. Ch. dismissed
Dec. 8, 2011).
77. Scully, No. 5890-VCL (Del. Ch. Dec. 23, 2010).
78. Transcript of Courtroom Status Conference at 5-6, Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology
Holdings, Inc., No. 5890-VCL (Del. Ch. Jan. 12, 2011).
79. Brief of Special Counsel at 26-27, Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology Holdings, Inc., No.
5890-VCL (Del. Ch. Mar. 11, 2011). The special counsel summarized the issue as follows:
[A] collusive settlement in the context of stockholder deal litigation appears to
involve, at its core, an explicit or implicit agreement between counsel for plaintiffs
and counsel for defendants to require less consideration for the settling class in
exchange for (1) exclusive dealings with particular plaintiffs' counsel and/or (2) more
consideration for plaintiffs' counsel. Factors that should give rise to heightened
scrutiny for collusiveness include the following: settlement consideration
disproportionately weak in comparison to the strength of the claims asserted;
settlement with a plaintiffs firm that typically does not litigate aggressively when
other, more formidable, firms are involved in the litigation; and an agreement to pay
attorneys' fees significantly higher than are typical given the settlement
consideration.
Id.
80. Id. at 28-29.
81. Transatlantic Holdings Transcript, supra note 59, at 5-6. The ruling-treating class
certification, settlement approval, and the fee award together-is an example of how courts may
collapse the analysis of settlement approval, corporate benefit, and the ultimate fee award. See
supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
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a fee, the Chancellor refused to do all three.82 In that case, the two class
representatives that had been put forward, one of whom held only two
shares, either did not vote on the transaction or did not recall how he had
voted.83  Class counsel did not perform "any real investigation. 84  The
disclosures amounted merely to additional background information,8 5 and
the vote was 99.85% in favor of the deal with 93% of the total electorate
casting votes.8 6 On the basis of these facts, the court concluded that the
plaintiffs had "achieved nothing substantial for the class," and therefore the
proposed settlement did not justify releasing the claims of absent parties.87
Current settlement practices raise a broader concern. As noted earlier,
upwards of 90% of mergers in recent years faced litigation challenges.8 8 Of
the lawsuits filed, 71.6% settled and nearly 77% of the settlements were
disclosure-only settlements.89 In short, plaintiffs negotiate, and courts
approve, corrective disclosure in more than 60% of all transactions.9" It is
implausible to think that 60% of all mergers (or 80% in the last several
years) with public company targets and a transaction value of more than
$100 million, deals that are staffed by top quality lawyers and investment
bankers, involve materially deficient disclosures. It is far more likely that
merger lawsuits are not filed to correct disclosure problems. The structure
of disclosure-only settlements is likely about something else-justification
of a fee award to plaintiffs' counsel.
C. The Fee Award
Once the court has approved the settlement, it must independently
consider the fee award. "[A] litigant who confers a common ... benefit
upon an ascertainable stockholder class is entitled to an award of counsel
fees and expenses for its efforts in creating the benefit." 9' The Delaware
courts have repeatedly explained that the court has an independent
obligation to determine an appropriate fee award, even in a case in which
the defendant has agreed not to oppose the plaintiffs' fee request. As the
court explained in PAETEC: "This Court has unambiguously held that'In
both [contested and uncontested fee applications], the Court has an
82. Transatlantic Holdings Transcript, supra note 59, at 5.
83. Id. at 5-6.
84. Id. at 8.
85. Id. at 7-8.
86. Id. at 10-11.
87. Id. at 10.
88. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
89. Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 478 tbl.III.
90. See id. (showing that 385 of 574 litigation cases resulted in corrective disclosure).
91. United Vanguard Fund, Inc. v. Takecare, Inc., 693 A.2d 1076, 1079 (Del. 1997).
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independent duty to award a fair and reasonable fee.",92  The court's
determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee is based on consideration
of the Sugarland93 factors:
(i) the amount of time and effort applied to the case by counsel for
the plaintiffs; (ii) the relative complexities of the litigation; (iii) the
standing and ability of petitioning counsel; (iv) the contingent nature
of the litigation; (v) the stage at which the litigation ended;
(vi) whether the plaintiff can rightly receive all the credit for the
benefit conferred or only a portion thereof; and (vii) the size of the
benefit conferred.
94
"Among these factors, the last two receive the greatest weight."
95
Thus, although judicial analysis of the fee award frequently includes a
discussion of hours expended, the quality of plaintiffs' counsel, and the
complexity of the case, the key consideration is typically the size of the
benefit conferred. Additionally, the Delaware Supreme Court has
repeatedly noted that, where the benefit provided by the litigation is
quantifiable, "Sugarland calls for an award of attorneys' fees based upon a
percentage of the benefit.,
96
The determination of corporate benefit in the context of a fee award is
obviously closely related to the assessment of settlement quality described
above. Specifically, enhanced disclosure has long been recognized as a
potential benefit.97 Because of the prevalence of disclosure settlements, the
Delaware courts have had frequent occasion to consider the circumstances
under which such a settlement justifies a fee award and the relationship
between the quality of the disclosures and the size of the reward. As the
Court noted in Sauer-Danfoss: "All supplemental disclosures are not
equal., 98 The courts have sought to achieve relative parity across cases,
observing that "[s]imilar disclosures merit similar fee awards." 99  In
92. In re PAETEC Holding Corp. S'holders Litig., No. 676 1-VCG, 2013 WL 1110811, at *5
(Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. S'holders
Litig., 65 A.3d 1116, 1137 (Del. Ch. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
93. Sugarland Indus., Inc. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142 (Del. 1980).
94. In re Plains Res. Inc. S'holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 071-N, 2005 WL 332811, at *3 (Del.
Ch. Feb. 4, 2005) (citing Sugarland, 420 A.2d at 149-50).
95. In re Celera Corp. S'holder Litig., No. 6304-VCP, 2012 WL 1020471, at *30 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 23, 2012); accord In re Anderson Clayton S'holders' Litig., no. 8387, 1988 WL 97480, at *3
(Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 1988) ("[T]his court has traditionally placed greatest weight upon the benefits
achieved by the litigation.").
96. Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1259 (Del. 2012).
97. See, e.g., Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162, 1165 (Del. 1989) ("A
heightened level of corporate disclosure, if attributable to the filing of a meritorious suit, may
justify an award of counsel fees.").
98. In re Sauer-Danfos Inc. S'holders Litig., 65 A.3d 1116, 1136 (Del. Ch. 2011).
99. Id.
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addition, the courts have expressly acknowledged the incentive effect of fee
decisions on future litigation and stated that fee awards should encourage
counsel to bring meritorious cases.' 00
Recent Delaware decisions display an increasing tendency to apply a
common heuristic for awarding fees in disclosure-only cases. The court
starts with a fee range based on precedent for the quantity and quality of
disclosures provided.101 A threshold requirement is that the supplemental
disclosure be material. °2  One or two "meaningful" disclosures sets a
baseline for the fee range.' 0 3  Lower quality (less valuable) disclosures
result in a downward departure from this benchmark and "particularly
significant or exceptional disclosures" are entitled to more.10 4 The fee may
then be adjusted further based upon the other Sugarland factors.' 05
The question of what types of disclosures are "meaningful" is a critical
aspect of the courts' analysis. Meaningful disclosures will be rewarded
(incentivized) with more generous fee awards. Trivial or unhelpful
disclosures will be compensated less generously or, in the extreme case,
may lead to disapproval of the settlement or denial of any fee award. In his
opinion in Sauer-Danfoss, Vice-Chancellor Laster provided three
appendices summarizing prior settlements and fee awards in the normal,
low, and high fee ranges. °6 A review of these appendices demonstrates
that most meaningful disclosures, for purposes of the courts' analysis, tend
to focus on "previously withheld projections or undisclosed conflicts faced
by fiduciaries or their advisors."' 7 Significantly, the Delaware courts have
stressed the importance of information regarding the investment banks'
100. E.g., Dias v. Purches, No. 7199VCG, 2012 WL 4503174, at *4 & n.29 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1,
2012). The Delaware courts' concern that fee awards provide appropriate incentives, including
strong incentives in meritorious cases, is not confined to merger litigation. See, e.g., Ams. Mining
Corp., 51 A.3d at 1252 (approving Chancery Court's award of $300 million fee on the ground that
it '"creates a healthy incentive for plaintiff's lawyers to actually seek real achievement for the
companies that they represent in derivative actions and the classes that they represent in class
actions' (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument on Plaintiffs Petition for Award of Attorneys'
Fees and Expenses and Rulings of the Court at 85, In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S'holder Derivative
Litig., 52 A.3d 761 (Del. Ch. 2011) (No. 96 1-CS)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
101. See, e.g., Sauer-Danfoss, 65 A.3d at 1136-38 (using three similar cases to arrive at a
base range of $75,000 to $80,000).
102. In re Celera Corp. S'holder Litig., No. 6304-VCP, 2012 WL 1020471, at *32 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 23, 2012); see also In re PAETEC Holding Corp. S'holders Litig., No. 6761-VCG, 2013
WL 1110811, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 2013) (commencing fee analysis by determining that,
because the package of settlement disclosures contained at least one material disclosure, the
settlement was fee eligible).
103. Sauer-Danfoss, 65 A.3d at 1136.
104. Id. at 1136-37.
105. Id. at 1135-36.
106. Id. at apps. A, B & C.
107. Id. at 1136.
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compensation and potential conflicts. 10 8  As Vice Chancellor Glasscock
recently explained: "The materiality of a disclosure of a conflicted financial
advisor does not necessarily depend on whether the conflict actually harmed
the sales process." 10 9  Less meaningful disclosures, by contrast, include
minor corrections or disclosure of further details concerning, for example,
discount rates, negotiation process, and valuation opinions. "°
D. A Framework for Measuring the Value of Nonpecuniary Relief
As we have summarized, virtually every merger currently faces a
litigation challenge. The vast majority of cases settle, but monetary
recoveries for shareholder plaintiffs are rare. Courts attempt to evaluate the
benefit produced by the proposed settlements and to compensate counsel on
the basis of that benefit, but the procedural disadvantages that they face in
the process render their judgments highly suspect, especially in the context
of disclosure-only settlements. The Delaware courts seem to share this
skepticism, given their own oft-repeated characterization of supplemental
disclosures as being of marginal utility at best.
We therefore suggest an alternative way of testing the value of
supplemental disclosures. Because the purpose of merger disclosure is to
inform shareholder voting, it is reasonable to view supplemental disclosure
as meaningful if it changes the way reasonable shareholders vote.''
Furthermore, it is reasonable to hypothesize that merger litigation is only
effective if it produces the disclosure of new negative information about the
merger. This is because the defendant corporation, without the prod of
shareholder litigation, already has an incentive to disclose positive
information in order to win approval of the transaction and minimize
dissent." 2  However, the transacting parties might prefer to conceal
negative information to reduce the risk that shareholders will refuse to
approve the transaction. Putting these two insights together, it seems clear
108. See, e.g., David P. Simonetti Rollover IRA v. Margolis, No. 3694-VCN, 2008 WL
5048692, at *8 (Del. Ch. June 27, 2008) ("[l]t is imperative for the stockholders to be able to
understand what factors might influence the financial advisor's analytical efforts.").
109. In re PAETEC Holding Corp. S'holders Litig., No. 6761-VCG, 2013 WL 1110811, at
*7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 2013).
110. Sauer-Danfoss, 65 A.3d at 1143 app. B.
111. See, e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 439 (1976) ("An omitted fact
is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important in deciding how to vote."); Transatlantic Holdings Transcript, supra note 59, at 4
(stating that the real question in evaluating a disclosure settlement is whether the supplemental
disclosures are "in any meaningful way of utility to someone voting on the merger").
112. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection
of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 683 (1984) (explaining that, without disclosure, "[i]nvestors
would assume the worst, because, they would reason that if the firm had anything good to say for
itself it would do so").
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that for supplemental disclosures to be meaningful, they must have a
negative impact on shareholder voting in favor of the merger. This leads to
a testable hypothesis: disclosure-only settlements should reduce shareholder
votes in favor of the deal.
Amendment settlements are different. The principal benefit of an
amendment is its potential to increase the value of the merger. An
amendment that increases the merger price is of obvious value to
shareholders without regard to its effect on the vote. Most amendment
settlements do not increase the merger consideration but instead alter an
agreement's deal-protection provisions, perhaps reducing a termination fee
or increasing a go-shop period."13 The value of these amendments is in
their potential to increase the chance of a subsequent higher bid."
14
Concededly, amendment settlements rarely lead to higher bid prices.
115
Nevertheless, reducing deal protections arguably improves the quality of
the market check. As a result, even when amendments do not result in a
higher bid, they arguably should increase shareholder confidence in the
economics of the deal. Our second core hypothesis then is that merger
litigation resulting in an amendment settlement should increase shareholder
support for the merger.
In the Part that follows, we identify and test our core hypotheses. We
also test a number of ancillary hypotheses relating to shareholder voting.
High-premium deals, for example, should lead to more favorable votes than
low-premium deals. Deals recommended by proxy advisory firms ought to
result in more favorable votes than deals for which those firms recommend
a vote against the transaction. Additionally, building upon the discussion
above, we hypothesize that attorneys' fees are an ex post facto assessment
of merits in merger litigation and thus that, at least in disclosure cases, for
the reasons articulated above, higher fees should correspond to fewer votes
in favor of the merger.
113. On deal protections generally, see Steven M. Davidoff & Christina M. Sautter, Lock-Up
Creep, 38 J. CORP. L. 681 (2013).
114. In re Compellent Techs., Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 6084-VCL, 2011 WL 6382523, at *1
(Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2011).
115. See DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 5, at 6 & fig.7 (explaining that the parties in only
I of 119 settling lawsuits in 2012 acknowledged that the settlement contributed to an increase in
the merger price). In any event, we would lose what overbids would occur from our dataset as a
result of the research design described below. See infra subpart II(A).
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II. Empirical Analysis of Merger Settlements and Shareholder Voting
A. Our Sample Set
Our sample contains all of the transactions listed in the FactSet
MergerMetrics 16 database and announced from 2005 through 2012 that
meet the following criteria: (1) the target is a U.S. firm publicly traded on
the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, or NASDAQ;
(2) the transaction size is at least $100 million; (3) the offer price is at least
$5 per share; (4) a merger agreement is signed and publicly disclosed
through a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); and
(5) the transaction has been completed as of the end of 2012. Information
on transactions and litigation is drawn from the dataset used in a prior piece
by one of the coauthors." 7
For shareholder voting outcomes and meeting dates we obtain
information from the Factset Proxy Data service. We supplement this with
information provided by ISS and by hand review of public filings. We also
search press wire services and news databases. ISS recommendations are
obtained from ISS itself. We then merge in institutional ownership data
from the Thomson Reuters database and stock price information from the
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. We also search by
hand in the Bloomberg Law database to determine if appraisal rights were
exercised for Delaware incorporated targets. We drop duplicate variables
and variables for which we have no voting results information. A
substantial number of transactions do not report any voting results even
though such a reporting is required under the securities laws.1 18 We arrive
at a sample size of 453 deal observations.
116. More information about the database can be found at FACTSET MERGERS (2014),
https://www.mergermetrics.com, archived at http://perma.cc/7U34-82CR.
117. Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 486-87.
118. Effective as of February 28, 2010 the SEC changed its disclosure rules to require that the
outcome of shareholder votes be reported on a Form 8-K filed within four business days after the
end of the meeting at which the vote occurred. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg.
68,334, 68,335 (Dec. 23, 2009) (to be codified at pts. 229, 239, 240, 249, 274).
Previously, these results were only required to be disclosed on the issuer's next-filed Form 10-
Q or Form 10-K. Id. at 68,349. However, a takeover is often completed and the issuer's shares
deregistered before this four-business-day period has elapsed. In those circumstances a Form 8-K
filing is not required. Id. This was true even before the rule revisions when a 10-Q or 10-K could
be due weeks or months after the acquisition's completion. Even when the acquisition occurs
more than four business days after the shareholders' meeting, issuers sometimes appear to ignore
the filing requirements and do not report results. The result is that of our sample size of 822
merged transactions, we have voting data for approximately half-453. We were unable to find
reported voting results for the remaining issuers. We thank Jennifer Shotwell of Innisfree for
explaining why we could not find voting results for so many mergers in our sample. In addition,
we excluded transactions where the reported results were approximate rather than exact.
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B. Descriptive Statistics
Set forth in Table I(A) are statistics on the number of transactions in
our sample set, the value of these transactions, and transaction offer premia.
Table I(A) Transaction Values and
Premiums ($$MM)
Transaction Value ($mm)
Enterprise Value ($mm)
Initial Premium
Final Premium
Std
N Mean Dev 25th % Median 75th %
453 $3,119 $6,902 $328 $957 $3,065
453 $4,272 $9,827 $399 $1,245 $3,697
453 32.73% 34.03% 14.86% 26.45% 41.30%
453 33.37% 34.47% 15.17% 26.97% 41.95%
Median transaction value across our sample size is $957 million.
Mean transaction size is a significantly higher $3.119 billion, showing that
the sample is right skewed with a standard deviation for transaction value of
$6.902 billion. The median initial offer premium as calculated thirty days
prior to announcement of the transaction is 26.45%. Final offer premium is
calculated identically and is a slightly higher 26.97% showing that there is
some increase in offer premium over announced and completed
transactions. These statistics are comparable to prior studies which have
found a similar range of size and premiums for transactions.11 9
Panel I(B) sets forth characteristics of the transactions in our sample.
Panel I(B): Transaction Characteristics
Total # Transactions
Merger Consideration = Cash
Auction
Go Shop
Going Private
Management Buy Out
N % All Transactions
453 100%
303 66.89%
187 41.28%
58 12.80%
22 4.86%
14 3.09%
We focus here on transaction characteristics which may affect
premium and shareholder voting. 303 or 66.89% of transactions were all
119. See, e.g., Leonce L. Bargeron et al., Why Do Private Acquirers Pay So Little Compared
to Public Acquirers?, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 375, 376 (2008) (stating that the average premium for
private-equity-firm acquisitions is 28.5%).
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cash consideration, meaning that shareholders were losing a stake in the
future combined entity. 187 or 41.28% transactions involved companies
being sold by auction as opposed to a single-bidder negotiation. Auction
transactions may be less prone to shareholder objection and therefore
receive higher votes because the target company has been more fully
shopped to a wider array of possible bidders. 12.80% of transactions
contained a go shop, a provision for a target to solicit bidders after
announcement of a merger agreement. These are largely private equity
transactions, which themselves comprise 15.89% of the sample. Conflicted
transactions involving management or a controlling shareholder were a
smaller part of the sample. Going private transactions comprise 4.86% of
transactions and management buy outs comprise 3.09% of transactions.
Because of the potential these transactions present for self-dealing, it may
be that shareholder support levels are lower.
Table I(C) examines litigation rates for our sample.
Table I(C): Litigation
% of Total
N Litigation
Litigation 319 100.00%
Settled 221 69.28%
Dismissed 65 20.38%
Multi-State 133 41.69%
Delaware Filing 142 44.51%
Delaware Settlement 67 21.00%
Litigation is brought in an average of 70.42% of transactions across
the time period of our study. The rate of litigation increased substantially
over the course of our sample period; one recent study found that litigation
rates have risen to 92.10% in 2011.120 Our sample matches these findings;
the litigation rate in our sample rises from 48.57% in 2005 to 95.12% in
2012. For the transactions with litigation, 221 or 69.28% result in some
type of settlement, 65 or 20.38% are dismissed, and the remainder are still
pending or are abandoned.
120. Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 469. As noted earlier, the rate of litigation continues
to increase, and litigation was filed in 97.5% of transactions in 2013, meaning that virtually every
deal was challenged. See supra text accompanying note 6.
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Table II(A) sets forth information on voting outcomes for our sample.
Table 11(A): Voting
Outcomes
N Mean St. Dev. 25th % Median 75th %
% Yes Votes
Per Votes Cast 393 96.73% 6.41% 97.13% 99.00% 99.70%
% Yes Votes
Per Outstanding
Shares 436 75.82% 8.77% 70.65% 76.00% 81.64%
% Yes Votes
Per All Yes & No
Votes 294 97.65% 5.25% 98.03% 99.52% 99.85%
Table II(A) reports shareholder voting outcomes by three different
metrics: (1) yes votes as a percentage of all votes cast; (2) yes votes as a
percentage of all outstanding shares;and (3) yes votes as a percentage of all
yes and no votes cast. The difference between the first and third
measurements is that the first measurement includes abstentions and broker
nonvotes. In our regressions and data analysis below we employ separately
run regressions using all three metrics. We believe that yes votes measured
as a percentage of votes cast best captures shareholder sentiment for a
transaction. The reason is that it captures the sentiment of those
shareholders who choose to be present at the meeting and cast a ballot or
abstain. Shareholder failure to vote at all can indicate a lack of support for
a transaction, but it may also be caused by a variety of factors that are
independent of the merits. 12 1 However, by examining all three metrics we
provide a robustness check to our results.
The mean percentage of yes votes per outstanding shares is 75.82%
with a standard deviation of 8.77%. However, the median percentage of
yes votes as a percentage of votes cast is 99.00%, meaning that half of all
transactions get an even higher number of yes votes. The statistics show
that shareholder voting in takeover transactions is largely a yes game
among shareholders who do cast votes. There is some dispersion among
transactions however, and the standard deviation for transactions as a
percentage of votes cast is 6.41%. We note that the median percentage of
121. For example, retail investors typically engage in very low levels of voting. See, e.g.,
Press Release, Broadbridge Fin. Solutions, Inc. & PwC's Ctr. for Bd. Governance, Broadridge and
PwC Announce New Data on 2013 Proxy Voting Trends 1 (June 4, 2013), available at
http://media.broadridge.com/documents/Broadridge-PwC-ProxyPulse-Press-Release-6-4-13.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/UEA8-TRW3 (reporting that 70% of shares held by retail investors
were not voted).
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yes votes when measured against outstanding shares is significantly lower,
meaning that a significant number of shares in any contest are not voted.
When shares are voted, it is almost always overwhelmingly in support of
the transaction.
Table I(B) sets forth descriptive statistics on types of litigation
settlements and voting outcomes based on percentage of yes votes per votes
cast.
Table II(B): Voting
Outcomes and Litigation
Settlements Per Votes Cast
N Mean St. Dev. 25th % Median 75th %
Disclosure-Only
Settlements 153 97.25% 5.60% 97.80% 99.10% 99.70%
Amendment
Settlement 26 97.90% 5.78% 98.54% 99.43% 99.84%
Increase-
Consideration
Settlement 12 95.64% 7.40% 96.42% 98.84% 99.50%
Total 191
The number of observations drops to 191 because we do not have
voting information as a percentage of yes votes per votes cast for all
observations with litigation, and not all litigation ends in settlement. The
median percentage of yes votes for disclosure-only settlements is at 99.10%
with a standard deviation of 5.60%. Amendment settlements had a higher
median percentage of yes votes at 99.43% with a standard deviation of
5.78%. Finally, settlements involving an increase in consideration had a
standard deviation of 7.40% with a median percentage of yes votes at
98.84%.
Table II(C) sets forth voting information by yes votes cast, sorted by
ISS recommendations.
Table II(C): ISS
Recommendations
Per Votes Cast
N Mean St. Dev. 25th % Median 75th %
ISS Rec =No 15 81.72% 12.23% 70.00% 80.90% 97.08%
ISS Rec =Yes 376 97.31% 5.29% 97.36% 99.03% 99.70%
2015]
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As the table shows, there is a large disparity in voting outcomes
between a positive ISS recommendation and a negative one.12 A
transaction with a "yes" ISS recommendation has a median percentage of
yes votes per votes cast of 99.03%. A transaction with a "no" ISS
recommendation has a median percentage of yes votes per votes cast of
80.90%. In unreported statistics we find that the median percentage of yes
votes as a percentage of the outstanding shares for a transaction with an ISS
"no" recommendation is 66.88% compared to 76.51% for a "yes"
recommendation. We also find similar results when we examine yes votes
as a percentage of total yes and no votes. In those circumstances the
median percentage of yes votes as a percentage of yes and no votes is
82.01% for a "no" recommendation compared to 99.55% for a "yes"
recommendation. We discuss further the possible effect and issues around
ISS recommendations below in our regression analysis.
C. Regression Analysis
Our regression analysis uses ordinary-least-squares regression. We
regress yes votes against the three types of voting metrics: yes votes per
(1) votes cast, (2) per outstanding shares, and (3) yes and no votes. We
include in our regressions a number of transaction variables, including final
premium paid, the proxy advisors' recommendation, and institutional
ownership. In the text of our Article we discuss the main findings from our
regressions. The full regressions with all variables are set forth in the
Appendix. Table III examines how shareholder voting outcomes are
affected by the three types of settlements: disclosure-only settlements,
amendment settlements, and settlements that produce increased merger
consideration.
122. The potential for ISS recommendations to affect voting outcomes has been discussed
extensively in the literature. See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of
Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869, 870-77 (2010) (identifying various
possible reasons for the relationship). As we discuss below, our findings demonstrate a strong
correlation between ISS recommendations and voting outcomes but do not provide evidence of
causation. See infra subpart II(C).
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Table III. Shareholder Voting Outcomes
and Litigation Settlements 23
Yes Votes Per Votes Cast Outstanding Yes and No Votes
1) (2) (3
FinalOffer Premium 0.105 ** 0.022 0.095 **
(0.03) (0.74) (0.04)
ISSPosition 0.155 *** 0.113 *** 0.124 *
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Disclosure-Only Settlement 0.000 0.011 0.003
(0.98) (0.22) (0.58)
Amendment Settlement 0.008 0.045 *** 0.017
(0.51) (0.01) (0.12)
Consideration-Increase
Settlement 0.005 0.057 ** 0.004
(0.80) (0.022) (0.809)
Observations 391 423 293
R-squared 0.2658 0.1228 0.2252
The variable with the strongest relationship to voting outcomes is the
recommendation made by ISS. The ISS variable, which is a dummy
variable representing whether ISS recommends a yes or no vote to its
clients, is positive and significant at the one percent level in all columns. In
our regressions, an ISS "yes" recommendation is associated with an
increase in the number of yes votes by anywhere from 11.30 to 15.5
percentage points. The significance of an ISS "yes" recommendation
123. Includes Year-Fixed Effects. P-values are in parentheses, with ***, **, and * denoting
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The following variables are
omitted from the table: Initial Offer Premium, Transaction Value (Log), Cash, Auction, Take
Private, Go Shop, and Super Majority State. The results for these variables and their definitions
are set forth in the Appendix. Final Offer Premium is measured over target's trading price thirty
days prior to merger announcement and is the final price paid by the buyer. ISS Position = 0
means ISS recommended that its' client shareholders do not vote or vote against the transactions.
ISS Position = 1 means that ISS recommended that its' client shareholders vote for the transaction.
Disclosure Settlement requires the target to make additional disclosure concerning the transaction;
Amendment Settlement requires the terms of the transaction to be revised and includes settlements
which are both Disclosure and Amendment settlements; and Consideration-Increase Settlement
provides for an increase in the consideration payable to target shareholders. Consideration-
Increase Settlement also includes settlements that have as a component Amendment or Disclosure
Settlements. The sample is defined in subpart II(A). See supra subpart II(A).
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explains in part why there is furious lobbying of ISS for its
recommendations. It also explains why ISS occupies a controversial role as
a proxy adviser.
124
It is unclear whether our findings with respect to the ISS
recommendation reflect causation or simply correlation. In other words, as
one of us has observed elsewhere, ISS recommendations may directly
influence shareholder votes; alternatively they may simply reflect how
shareholders were going to vote anyway. 25  Furthermore, at least in our
sample, ISS "no" recommendations are infrequent. We have only 17 "no"
recommendations and 423 "yes" recommendations for the transactions in
which we have voting information.
26
Our variable for final offer premium measures the difference between
the final offer price and the target's trading price thirty days before the
announcement of the merger. We might expect that mergers involving a
higher premium would generate a higher approval rate, and our regressions
are consistent with this hypothesis. The variables for final offer premium
are significant for the models examining yes votes as a percentage of votes
cast and yes and no votes as a percentage of votes. The coefficients on the
final offer premium in these models are also positive, meaning that the
higher the final offer premium the higher the number of yes votes. We note
that our results are not significant in the models for yes votes as a
percentage of outstanding shares. We think it is likely that, in these models,
the significance of the offer premium is affected by the noisiness of the
nonvotes. In addition, it is likely that the premium does not drive the issue
of whether or not shareholders vote, although it does drive whether they
cast a yes or no vote once they have decided to vote.' 27 This is consistent
with our earlier intuition that shareholders fail to vote largely for reasons
124. The SEC recently issued new guidance about investor reliance on proxy advisors. See
Proxy Voting: Proxy Voting Responsibilities of Investment Advisers and Availability of
Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for Proxy Advisory Firms, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION (June 30, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb20.htm, archived at http://per
ma.cc/LFJ2-KSFH (providing "guidance about investment advisers' responsibilities in voting
client proxies"). •
125. Choi et al., supra note 122, at 881.
126. For shareholder voting results reported where the results are per yes and no votes there
were 9 ISS "no" recommendations and 284 "yes" recommendations, and for yes votes per
outstanding shares there are 16 "no" recommendations and 407 "yes" recommendations.
127. In order to exercise appraisal rights shareholders must vote no, so the intention to
exercise appraisal rights may affect shareholder voting. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2011)
("[A] stockholder... who has neither voted in favor of the merger or consolidation nor consented
thereto in writing ... shall be entitled to an appraisal .... "). However, in regressions reported in
the Appendix containing other settlement variables we do not find the inclusion of a variable
reflecting whether shareholders to seek appraisal percentage to be consistently significant.
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that are independent of the merits of the issue on which they are being
asked to vote.
128
In terms of our primary hypothesis-that disclosure-only settlements
would have a negative effect on shareholder voting because they reflect the
introduction of additional negative information about the merger-our
regression results do not support this hypothesis. 129 Rather we find a non-
effect. The coefficient for the variable Disclosure Settlement is not
significant in any columns, meaning that in none of our models is a
disclosure-only settlement correlated with a significantly different level of
shareholder support for the merger. 30 The lack of a significant relationship
between disclosure-only settlements and shareholder voting suggests that
shareholders may not value the additional information from these
disclosures at least in a way that affects their vote.' 31
128. In unreported regressions we substitute the initial Offer Premium and Final Offer
Premium variable with a Low Offer Premium variable. Low Offer Premium is constructed by
taking the trailing one-year Final Offer Premium and toggling the variable Low Offer Premium to
1 if it is below the median and 0 otherwise. We find no significant change in the regressions,
including the insignificant effects on the Disclosure Settlement variable. In models (1) and (3)
above the variable is negative and significant at the 10% and 5% level, respectively.
129. As a robustness test we also run time-series analysis to examine if there are any excess
returns upon the announcement of a disclosure settlement. We hypothesize two alternative
hypotheses based on the fact that once a takeover is announced, the main driver of a stock price is
whether or not the takeover will be completed at the price paid. Our first hypothesis is that
disclosure settlements will have no effect or a positive effect on share prices. The reason why is
that the information is unlikely to significantly affect shareholder voting to an extent significant
enough to cause shareholders to vote down the transaction. In this regard, the settlement of the
litigation may actually cause a target's share price to increase because any possible delay that may
be caused by the litigation, such as an injunction, has been removed or the deal has otherwise now
been vetted. Alternatively, if disclosure settlements are valued by shareholders to the extent that
the disclosures in a disclosure settlement may influence the outcome of a transaction or otherwise
to cause them to agitate to increase the share price or against the transaction, then the share price
should go down. In light of these hypotheses, we run a time series analysis using 2, 3, 4, and 5
day annual returns as measured against the S&P 500 index. We find significant results at the 5%
level for all returns with mean excess returns of .0041, .0062, .0069, and .008 and p-values of
.019, .011, .024, and .017, respectively. The results provide support for our first hypothesis, that
disclosure settlements have no effect with some evidence that they may be seen as providing deal
certainty because of the settlement of the litigation on favorable returns. Alternatively, the
favorable result may be seen as shareholder satisfaction with the "vetting" process of this
litigation and their subsequent confirmation that this is a good deal due to the settlement and
perhaps the additional disclosure. We find no support for the second hypothesis that disclosure
settlements provide information materially and adversely affecting the shareholder vote.
130. Because our models are linear, we also run in unreported results the models using the log
value of each shareholder vote. We do not find any significant results on the Disclosure-
Settlement variable.
13 1. We acknowledge that there also may be some unobserved factor present in these
transactions that produces more negative votes. However, we also note the relatively high R-
squared for our regressions in columns (1) and (2), indicating that we appear to account for many
of these variables in our regressions.
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We note the tension between this finding and the general practice of
the courts in accepting supplemental disclosure as a benefit to shareholders.
Chancellor William Chandler appears to have been correct in concluding in
National City' 32 that "[n]o evidence exists that the additional disclosures
significantly affected the outcome of the shareholder vote."'133 The court
nonetheless awarded the attorneys who conducted the litigation that
produced these "modest" disclosures a $400,000 fee. 13 4  In contrast, our
findings suggest that Chancellor Strine's similar conclusion in Amylin 135
was correct: "[N]one of the disclosures anybody got changed the vote."'1 36
Similarly, to the extent that courts characterize supplemental disclosures as
material, meaning information that a reasonable shareholder would consider
important in deciding how to vote, our regressions suggest that shareholders
do not, in fact, consider the disclosures important.
In contrast, the coefficient on amendment settlements is positive and
significant in column (2). The coefficient is .045, which means that the
shareholder yes vote as measured against outstanding shares increases an
average of 4.50% points for amendment settlements relative to other
transactions. We do not find these results for other measurements of
shareholder voting in columns (1) and (3). The reason for the difference
may be that yes votes as a measure of outstanding votes picks up whether
shareholders vote or not, while the other metrics are whether shareholders
vote yes or no. We do not have an explanation why an amendment
settlement may pick up more shareholder votes as opposed to more yes
votes. We note that of settlements in our sample involving an amendment
to the merger agreement, 55% involved a reduction of the termination
fee. 
13 7
The variable for consideration-increase settlements is also statistically
significant but not significantly more than amendment settlements and
132. In re Nat'l City Corp. S'holders Litig., No. 4123-CC, 2009 WL 2425389, at *6 (Del. Ch.
July 31, 2009), aff'd, 998 A.2d 851 (Del. 2010).
133. Id. at *6.
134. Id. at *4, *6.
135. In re Amylin Pharm., Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 7673-CS (Del. Ch. Feb. 5, 2013).
136. Transcript of Hearing on Peter Doucet's Motion to Intervene and for an Award of
Attorneys' Fees and Expenses, Settlement Hearing, and Rulings of the Court at 23-24, In re
Amylin Pharm., Inc. S'Holders Litig., No. 7673-CS (Del. Ch. Feb. 21, 2013) [hereinafter
Transcript of Amylin Hearing]; see also id. at 23 (making the further point that "not one of [the
supplemental disclosures] would any rational investor think was materially important").
137. In unreported regressions, we do not find any significance when we include a disclosure-
plus variable. These settlements include disclosure plus an amendment. Our findings support one
hypothesis-that the disclosure component is an add-on that does not significantly contribute
value to the settlement. This finding is also consistent with judge and practitioner criticism that
these settlements simply change a term or two of the merger agreement and add on a disclosure
component to maximize attorneys' fees. In other words, our findings support the conclusion that
shareholders view these settlements as neither value enhancing nor value destroying.
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again only in column (2). This result may seem counterintuitive-if a deal
has been litigation tested and that litigation generated a higher price, one
might think shareholder approval rates would be significantly higher. One
possible explanation is that deals in which the litigation produces a higher
price are deals that were suspect to begin with--deals that raise serious
issues about process or conflicts of interest. While these concerns warrant
an economically meaningful settlement, the price increase negotiated as a
result of the settlement may still be lower than the reserve price of some
shareholders.
1 38
Hypothesizing that because courts attempt to award attorneys' fees in
cases that produce meaningful benefits to shareholders, we next test the
significance of the attorneys' fee award in predicting the percentage of yes
votes.
138. We note that Increase-Consideration Settlements disproportionately occur in going-
private transactions. 5 of 12 such settlements occur in transactions that are going private, or
41.67%, yet only 22 out of 453 transactions in our sample are going private transactions.
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Table IV. Shareholder Voting, Attorneys' Fees, and Settlements 39
Outstanding
Yes Votes Per Votes Cast Shares Yes and No Votes
(1) (2) (3)
Final Offer Premium 0.172 *** 0.08 0.18 ***
(0.00) (0.37) (0.00)
ISS Position 0.195 *** 0.14 *** 0.169 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Attorney Fee > 500 0.006 0.01 -0.003
(0.54) (0.52) (0.74)
Attorney Fees (Log) -0.013 ** -0.005 -0.005
(0.03) (0.57) (0.36)
Disclosure-Only
Settlement 0.006 -0.010 0.016
(0.67) (0.64) (0.21)
Amendment
Settlement 0.027 * 0.029 0.034 **
(0.09) (0.27) (0.03)
Consideration-
Increase Settlement 0.035 0.046 0.024
(0.11) (0.19) (0.23)
Observations 175 190 144
R-squared 0.4259 0.1558 0.3354
Contrary to the hypothesis that attorneys' fees are ex post facto
assessments of the merit of merger litigation, we do not find any consistent
relationship between the fee and the shareholder vote. In column (1) we
find a slight relationship between attorneys' fees and the percentage of yes
votes per vote cast. The coefficient is significant and negative, meaning the
lower the attorneys' fee, the lower the number of yes votes as a percentage
of votes cast. But the models measuring yes votes as a percentage of
139. Includes Year Fixed Effects. The following variables are omitted from the table: Initial
Offer Premium, Transaction Value (Log), Cash, Auction, Take Private, Go-Shop, and Super
Majority State. The results for these variables and their definitions are set forth in the Appendix.
Attorneys'Fees (Log) is the log value of attorneys' fee awarded in the litigation. Attorneys'Fee >
500 coded = 1 if the attorneys' fees awarded in the litigation are greater than $500,000 and = 0 if
the attorneys' fees awarded are less than $500,000. The sample and all other variables are defined
in supra note 123.
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outstanding shares and yes and no votes are not significant for this variable.
In addition, we do not find significance when we include a dummy variable
for whether attorneys' fees are above or below $500,000, a threshold that
some scholars have found to be the approximate average for disclosure
settlements and that has been cited by the courts as a starting point in
determining the appropriate award for a meritorious settlement.
140
These findings are cause for concern. To the extent that courts are
making fee determinations to incentivize litigation that is valuable to
shareholders, there does not appear to be a significant relationship between
the size of the award and the subsequent shareholder vote. Yet if the
disclosure does not affect the shareholder vote, it is difficult to see how
shareholders benefit from it.14 1 Notably, the coefficients for ISS Position in
this model become more significant, implying that a "yes" recommendation
for this sample correlates with a percentage change in votes ranging from
14.00% to 19.50%.142
We note that in columns (1) and (3) the coefficient on amendment
settlements is positive and significant, meaning those transactions with such
a settlement obtain a higher percentage of yes votes. In contrast, the
variable consideration-increase settlement is not significant in any model.
We are not certain of the reason for the differences in this model for
amendment settlements and increased consideration settlements from our
prior model in Table III. We note that in this model, we include only
settlements with attorneys' fees, meaning that we have a smaller sample
than in Table III and that, in addition, our sample sizes for both these
categories are substantially smaller than for disclosure-only settlements. It
may also be the case that outlier cases, in which the merger is substantively
unfair, may be driving the results in these categories.
140. See Gen-Probe Transcript, supra note 13, at 46 ("1 try to stick to the ranges [for fee
amounts], and I have said repeatedly about the $450 to $500,000 range as being something that I
start on."); Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 482 tbl.IV.B (providing statistics on average fee
awards by state).
141. One could hypothesize that shareholder voting rights, like voting rights of citizens,
implicate autonomy considerations such that a shareholder derives some value from voting in the
same way but while in possession of better information about the choice. Even if this were true, it
is not clear that merger litigation is intended to foster these democratic values as opposed to
shareholders' economic interests.
142. We also note in the Appendix that in models including the appraisal variable, the
disclosure variable is also not significant and negative, meaning that in the presence of a
disclosure settlement, there are fewer yes votes as a percentage of outstanding shares. However,
the variables for amendment settlement and consideration-increase settlement are significant in all
models.
2015]
Texas Law Review
Table V. Shareholder Voting
Outcomes & Institutional Ownership
43
Shareholder Yes Votes Per Votes Cast
All Transactions
Transaction Value
< $500M
Institutional Ownership %
Top 5 Institutional Ownership
Top 10 Institutional Ownership
0.041
(0.01)
ISS Position
** 0.023
(0.52)
-0.108
(0.56)
0.086
(0.58)
-0.043
(0.74)
0.086
(0.84)
0.141
(0.74)
0.154 *** 0.232 ***
Disclosure-Only Settlement
Amendment Settlement
Consideration-Increase Settlement
(0.00)
-0.003
(0.68)
0.009
(0.47)
0.002
(0.00)
-0.021
(0.19)
-0.035
(0.31)
0.025
(0.91) (0.75)
Observations 393 391 140
R-squared 0.0543 0.2642 0.3439
In our final table, we regress shareholder yes votes as a percentage of
votes cast against various institutional ownership variables. We
hypothesize that institutional shareholders may be better able to assess
merger-litigation settlements, particularly any additional disclosure made
upon a disclosure settlement. If this hypothesis is true, we would expect to
143. Includes Year-Fixed Effects. The following variables are omitted from the table: Initial
Offer Premium, Final Offer Premium, and Transaction Value (Log). In models (2) and (3), the
variable Maximum Institutional Ownership is also omitted. The results for these variables and
their definitions are set forth in the Appendix. Institutional Ownership % is the percentage of total
institutional ownership. Top 5 Institutional Ownership is the percentage ownership of the largest
5 institutional owners. Top 10 Institutional Ownership is the percentage ownership of the largest
10 institutional owners. Institutional ownership for each of these variables is as of the quarter end
immediately prior to the shareholder meeting date. The sample and all other variables are defined
in supra note 123.
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see settlements have a greater effect on merger votes in companies with
high levels of institutional ownership. Measured in a variety of ways,
however, we find no effect of institutional ownership on shareholder
assessment of merger-litigation settlements. However, the R-squared in
column (1) is relatively low, meaning that the drivers of voting in this
model are attributable to other variables. This implies that while the
institutional investor ownership percentage does affect voting, it may be
captured by these other variables.
To further test the effect of institutional ownership on shareholder
voting, we theorize that in smaller transactions (less than $500 million),
institutional shareholders may affect the outcome more greatly. In column
(3) we do not find this to be the case; the institutional shareholder variable
is not significant. We also do not find any significance in these smaller
transactions for institutional ownership variables.
We run the same regressions in unreported models using the dependent
variable percentage of yes votes per yes and no votes. We find in all
models that the disclosure settlement variable is insignificant. Again, the
most significant variable for institutional investors is the ISS
recommendation, which is positive and significant at the one percent level.
Similar to our earlier findings, institutional investors do not appear to find
disclosure settlements to be significant.
III. Policy Implications: Ending Fees for Disclosure Settlements
The findings in Part I raise serious concerns about the existing state of
merger litigation, in which the vast majority of mergers are challenged and
the resulting litigation produces a disclosure-only settlement, but the
disclosures do not seem to affect shareholder voting on the merger. Insofar
as disclosure-only settlements do not provide shareholders with useful
information, they are wasteful, clogging the courts and increasing
transaction costs for no reason. Nevertheless, the current practice of
treating disclosure-only settlements as a shareholder benefit sufficient to
entitle plaintiffs' attorneys to a fee award incentivizes attorneys to file
claims in order to win those settlements. On the basis of our empirical
findings, we argue that this incentive is misplaced.
The fundamental claim in state court merger litigation is based on
allegations that the merger process and the merger price are unfair.144 It
appears that, when plaintiffs' attorneys are unable to demonstrate
unfairness, they turn to supplemental disclosures to justify an award of fees
for their time and expense. In contrast, private litigation under the federal
144. See generally Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (defining
substantive fairness as involving issues of process and price).
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securities laws focuses precisely on material deficiencies in disclosure
against a backdrop of extensive disclosure regulation. 145 In our view, this is
a form of efficient specialization that ought to be recognized as a matter of
law. Merger litigation, under state law, should address substantive and
procedural fairness. Merger litigation, under federal law, should address
disclosure quality.
The U.S. Supreme Court has already taken the first step in this
direction, holding in Santa Fe v. Green that the federal antifraud provisions
do not address issues of merger fairness.1 46 In this Part, we propose that
Delaware cooperate by limiting the role of state law in regulating merger
disclosure. Specifically, we propose that the courts reject disclosure-only
settlements as providing a benefit to shareholders sufficient to justify the
award of attorneys' fees, at least in cases involving publicly traded target
companies. The subparts that follow develop this proposal in greater detail,
explaining how the federal securities laws are better suited to regulating
merger disclosure, anticipating and answering objections, and then offering
specific suggestions on how the solution might be implemented.
A. Federal Regulation of Merger Disclosure
The federal securities laws are all about disclosure. 47  The public
offering process has, as its central feature, a detailed disclosure document-
the Registration Statement-the role of which is established by Section 5 of
the Securities Act of 1933.148 The applicable rules concerning subjects such
as prefiling offers, prospectus delivery, liabilities, and due diligence are all
designed to enhance the effectiveness of the disclosure mandate. Following
an initial public offering, federal law subjects public companies to
continued periodic disclosure obligations through the reporting require-
ments of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and the rules
promulgated thereunder. 1
49
145. See generally Joel Seligman, Commentary, The Merits Do Matter: A Comment on
Professor Grundfest's "'Disimplying Private Rights ofAction Under the Federal Securities Laws:
The Commission's Authority, " 108 HARV. L. REv. 438, 456 (1994) (describing the role of private
securities fraud litigation in enforcing the federal mandatory disclosure system).
146. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977).
147. 1 LouIs LOSS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 10 (6th ed. 2011).
148. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77f(c) (2012).
149. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2012). What it means to be a
public company is somewhat different for purposes of the registration requirements of the
Securities Act and the periodic reporting requirements of the 1934 Act. See Donald C.
Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, "Publicness" in Contemporary Securities Regulation After
the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 343-46 (2013) (describing "bifurcation" in the concept of
"publicness").
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Federal law also mandates disclosure in connection with shareholder
voting through the federal proxy rules. 50 As a result, the federal securities
laws have long been the primary source of explicit disclosure obligations in
connection with mergers and acquisitions involving public companies.1
51
The SEC mandates certain disclosures in the Schedule 14A proxy
statement, 152 and it supplements these requirements with particularized
additional disclosures in connection with tender offers and going-private
transactions. 53 Thus, in most cases, the disclosure deficiencies challenged
in state merger litigation are located within a federally mandated disclosure
document. In addition, the supplemental disclosures that are agreed upon in
the settlement of state court litigation are ultimately incorporated into the
federally mandated form.
The federal disclosure requirements are primarily rule based. 154 The
federal statutes and the SEC rules thereunder require the disclosure of
information concerning many of the same items that are frequently the
subject of state law disclosure-only settlements, including valuation
procedures, financial advisor opinions, and potential conflicts of interest.'55
For example, the proxy rules require detailed transaction information,
including information relating to reports, opinions, or appraisals given by
financial advisors.' 56 Disclosure concerning the selection and compensation
of outside financial advisors is likewise required in going-private
transactions, along with disclosure of any other material relationships
between the company and the advisor.
157
150. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(h)(l)(D).
15 1. State corporation law does require corporations to disclose shareholder appraisal rights.
E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(d) (2011); see also Gilliland v. Motorola, Inc., 859 A.2d 80,
85-88 (Del. Ch. 2004) (addressing the disclosure requirements under the appraisal statute).
152. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2014).
153. Id. §§ 240.14d-100, 240.13e-100.
154. See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Public Governance, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1012, 1023
(2013) (describing how Sarbanes-Oxley replaced flexible state law standards with "firm rules").
See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557
(1992) (articulating the distinction between using rules versus standards to regulate).
155. See Wilson v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 855 F.2d 987, 991, 993-94 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding
that in a merger between corporations A and B, failure to disclose that general counsel of
corporation A personally represented senior executives of corporation B and that he and his firm
served as counsel to several entities controlled by these executives constituted material
omissions); Kas v. Fin. Gen. Bankshares, Inc., 796 F.2d 508, 513 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("The violation
arising from the failure to disclose such a potential conflict of interest does not turn on the failure
to disclose a director's true motivations but rather stems from the failure to disclose a fact that
puts the shareholder on notice of a potential impairment of the director's judgment."); Joel
Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 38-46 (1993) (discussing disclosure
obligations under 13e-3 for going-private transactions).
156. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101.
157. Id. § 229.1015(b).
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The disclosure requirements of federal law reflect a delicate balance.
On the one hand, some commentators argue that, in general, more
information is better.' 58 Other commentators argue that even some material
disclosures might be counterproductive if they overwhelm investors with
too much information that cannot be used properly.' 59  The SEC's
disclosure requirements are subject to ongoing debate, public scrutiny, and,
on occasion, legal challenge, 160 as the SEC seeks to strike an appropriate
balance both in terms of providing useful information and imposing
reasonable costs on market participants. As some commentators have
noted, the SEC's rule-making process offers particular advantages in
evaluating the costs and benefits of proposed disclosure requirements, such
as the opportunity for affected market participants to provide input.' 61
The principal difference between state and federal disclosure mandates
in connection with merger transactions is that federal law involves
proscriptive rules of general application, whereas Delaware judges
articulate disclosure requirements in the fact-specific context of individual
transactions. 162  Under federal law, the failure to disclose even material
information is not actionable unless SEC rules specifically mandate
disclosure of that information or unless the omission renders other
disclosures misleading. 63 The failure to include all material information in
a proxy statement does not violate federal law.' 64  As the Third Circuit
explained: "[O]mission of information from a proxy statement will violate
158. See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Personal Facts About Executive Officers: A
Proposal for Tailored Disclosures to Encourage Reasonable Investor Behavior, 42 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 749, 795 (2007) (arguing for codification of disclosure rules relating to
executives' private facts).
159. E.g., Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences
for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH U. L.Q. 417, 419 (2003); see also Steven M. Davidoff &
Claire A. Hill, Limits of Disclosure, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 599, 603 (2013) ("[T]he role of
disclosure in investment decisions is far more limited, and far less straightforward, than is
typically assumed.").
160. See, e.g., Going Private Transactions by Public Companies or Their Affiliates, 73 Fed.
Reg. 60,090, 60,090-91 (Oct. 9, 2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (describing and
defending proposed amendments to disclosure requirements in connection with going-private
transactions); Petition for Review at 1, Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 956 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C.
2013) (No. 12-1422) (challenging the SEC's conflict minerals disclosure requirement).
161. See David Friedman, Note, The Regulator in Robes: Examining the SEC and the
Delaware Court of Chancery's Parallel Disclosure Regimes, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1543, 1573-75
(2013) (arguing that the SEC should codify Delaware's disclosure rules through notice-and-
comment rule making and eliminate the existence of two different sets of disclosure
requirements).
162. See id. at 1553 ("[T]he fact-specific nature of Chancery decisions differentiates them
from the broad, prospective rules typically generated by regulatory agencies.").
163. Resnik v. Swartz, 303 F.3d 147, 151 n.2 (2d Cir. 2002).
164. See, e.g., Perelman v. Pa. Real Estate Inv. Trust, 432 F. Supp. 1298, 1304 (E.D. Pa.
1977).
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[§ 14(a) and Rule 14a-9] if either the SEC regulations specifically require
disclosure of the omitted information in a proxy statement, or the omission
makes other statements in the proxy statement materially false or
misleading.' 65
The distinction is perhaps best illustrated with respect to the disclosure
of compensation and conflicts of financial advisors. The SEC requires a
descriptive summary of the financial advisors' compensation. 166  Staff
interpretations have often required a breakdown of how much of the
advisor's fee was fixed versus contingent.' 67  Delaware precedent, in
contrast, requires disclosure of "substantial" contingent fees without clearly
articulating the standard by which a fee is judged to be substantial. 68
Likewise, federal law requires the disclosure of "material relationships"
existing between the advisor and the other party in the transaction over the
prior two years,' 69 but several Delaware decisions have compelled
considerably more detailed disclosure about investment banker
relationships and potential conflicts.170  Finally, Delaware has recently
required the disclosure of a financial advisor's interest in a deal, through
institutional or personal holdings, while SEC rules are silent on this issue. 7 '
Thus, in El Paso,172 Chancellor Strine termed Goldman's lead banker's
failure to disclose a personal $340,000 ownership interest in the buyer's
stock "very troubling," although it was unclear that disclosure of this
interest was required under federal law. 173
Shareholders can enforce their disclosure rights under federal law
through litigation. Rule 14a-9 prohibits fraud in connection with the
solicitation of proxies, and the U.S. Supreme Court has held that it provides
a private right of action for false and misleading proxy statements. 74 In
addition, to the extent that shareholders sell their stock in connection with a
merger, they have a cause of action under SEC rule 1Ob-5.175 The elements
165. Seinfeld v. Becherer, 461 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2006) (alteration in original) (quoting
Resnik, 303 F.3d at 151) (internal quotation marks omitted).
166. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1015(b)(4) (2014).
167. For more information on staff interpretations of the rule, see generally Steven M.
Davidoff, Fairness Opinions, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1557, 1592-93 (2006).
168. Friedman, supra note 161, at 1554-56.
169. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1015(b)(4); FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., FINRA MANUAL
§ 5150(a)(3) (2008), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/displaymain.htmlrbid=
2403&element _id=6832, archived at http://perma.cc/6QBN-9PG4.
170. Friedman, supra note 161, at 1556-58.
171. See id. at 1553 (comparing Delaware decisions to the SEC's "lax" rules for disclosure of
financial advisors' conflicts).
172. In re El Paso Corp. S'holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432 (Del. Ch. 2012).
173. Id. at 442.
174. J.l. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 429-31 (1964).
175. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2014).
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of proxy fraud and securities fraud are quite similar. Both require a
material misstatement or omission, damages, and a causal relationship
between the two. 
1 76
Importantly, liability under federal law turns on materiality.
77
Misstatements and omissions in federally mandated disclosure documents
are actionable if and only if they are material. 178 In the context of the proxy
statement, the Supreme Court stated that a fact is material "if there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important in deciding how to vote."' 179  Critically, as Richard Booth has
explained, this means that some investors must react to the information.
80
The federal courts have developed an extensive jurisprudence
concerning the materiality requirement.' 81  Courts consider the role of
specific statements within the context of the document in which they are
contained, the relevance of other disclosures and general information
environment applicable to the issuer, the nature of the information involved
(including its capacity to affect the market and the degree to which it is
speculative or subjective), the importance of the speaker's identity to the
materiality determination, and a host of other factors.182 Although the legal
definition of materiality is broadly inclusive, 183 courts have also adopted
various qualifications to evaluate the specific disclosures in the context of
the particular document in which it is contained, the transaction that it
involves, and the overall amount of information present in the market.1
8 4
Private litigation is a viable remedy for truly deficient disclosures in a
proxy statement. Federal litigation offers two potential mechanisms for
redress. First, federal courts will provide expedited proceedings and issue
an injunction mandating corrective disclosure prior to the shareholder
176. Compare Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 502 F.3d 212, 228 (3d Cir. 2007)
(describing elements of a claim under Rule 14a-9), with Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton
Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184 (2011) (listing elements of a violation of Rule 1Ob-5). The Supreme
Court has reserved the question of whether scienter, which is required in a private action under
Rule lOb-5, is also required under Rule 14a-9. Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083,
1090 n.5 (1991).
177. Notably, the federal courts have interpreted the materiality requirement analogously with
respect to proxy fraud and federal securities fraud. Heminway, supra note 158, at 759.
178. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 444 (1976).
179. Id. at 449.
180. Richard A. Booth, The Two Faces Of Materiality, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 517, 519 (2013).
181. See Heminway, supra note 158, at 756-59 (describing decisional law on materiality).
182. See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1312 (2011) (explaining that
"assessing materiality"... "is a fact-specific inquiry"); Heminway, supra note 158, at 756-59.
183. Dale A. Oesterle, The Overused and Under-Defined Notion of "Material" in Securities
Law, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 167, 169 (2011).
184. See id. at 184-86 (identifying examples such as the "bespeaks caution" doctrine and the
truth-in-the-market exception).
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vote. 8 5  Second, federal courts can provide ex post money damages.
18 6
That these remedies are meaningful is illustrated by the fact that federal
litigation frequently settles for meaningful monetary consideration. For
example, in the merger of Bank of America and Merrill Lynch, it was later
revealed that Bank of America had learned of massive losses at Merrill
Lynch just before the Bank of America shareholder vote on the
transaction. 87 Shareholders filed a federal claim under Rule 14a-9 in the
Southern District of New York and subsequently settled, not for a form of
nonpecuniary relief, but rather for $2.4 billion in money damages.,
88
Notably, federal litigation also addresses the potential for frivolous
litigation. In the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), 8 9
Congress adopted a variety of substantive and procedural reforms designed
to discourage meritless cases while retaining meaningful litigation
challenges. For example, the PSLRA imposes a heightened pleading
standard for the allegation of disclosure violations. Pursuant to the PSLRA,
to state a claim a complaint must (1) "specify each statement alleged to
have been misleading, [and] the reason or reasons why the statement is
misleading,"' 90 and (2) "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind."' 9 1 This
standard applies to claims under Rule 14a-9 as well as Rule lOb-5.' 92
Courts have also concluded that many of the procedural reforms of the
PSLRA, for example, apply to proxy fraud litigation, such as the stay of
discovery pending the resolution of a motion to dismiss. 193 Similarly,
courts have noted that the causation requirement prevents every disclosure
185. E.g., Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Adams, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1150 (D.
Kan. 2001); Gillette Co. v. RB Partners, 693 F. Supp. 1266, 1267-68, 1295 (D. Mass. 1988).
186. E.g., Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1303-04 (2d Cir. 1973).
187. Halah Touryalai, Bank of America Will Pony Up $2.4 Billion to Investors over Merrill
Lynch Merger, FORBES (Sept. 28, 2012, 10:45 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2
012/09/28/bank-of-america-wilI-pay-investors-2-4-billion-over-merrill-lynch-merger archived at
http://perma.cc/RCE7-HGC8.
188. Timothy Raub, Final Approval of $2.4Billion Settlement Granted in Bank of America
Securities Suit, LEXISNEXIS LEGAL NEWSROOM LITIG. (Apr. 8, 2013, 4:45 PM),
http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/litigation/b/litigation-blog/archive/2013/04/08/final-
approval-of-2-4billion-settlement-granted-in-bank-of-america-securities-suit.aspx archived at
http://perma.cc/9GA6-PJRE.
189. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
190. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2012).
191. Id. § 78u-4(b)(1).
192. See Little Gem Life Scis. LLC v. Orphan Med., Inc., 537 F.3d 913, 915, 917 (8th Cir.
2008) (applying the heightened pleading requirements under the PSLRA to a claim under Rule
14a-9).
193. See, e.g., Smith v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-281, 2012 WL 5479061, at *1 2
(S.D. Ohio Oct. 26, 2012) (applying the PSLRA discovery stay to proxy fraud litigation); Dipple
v. Odell, 870 F. Supp. 2d 386, 392-93 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (same).
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failure from constituting a violation of Rule 14a-9.194 Accordingly, both
federal regulation and federal litigation attempt to strike a balance in terms
of the scope of disclosure that they mandate and the extent to which
violations of the regulatory requirements can be challenged through
litigation.
B. State Law Disclosure Litigation
Although, as noted above, the core concern of state fiduciary duty
litigation with regard to mergers is the substantive fairness of the
transaction, state law merger complaints often include disclosure claims.
Delaware courts have adopted a materiality requirement that is akin to the
federal standard. According to the court in Sauer-Danfoss, in order for
supplemental disclosures to constitute a substantial benefit sufficient to
justify an award of attorneys' fees, the disclosures must be material. 95 This
standard was applied by Chancellor Strine in Amylin to deny a fee request
on the basis of the finding that the supplemental disclosures amounted only
to "additional meaningless disclosures that did not materially change the
mix of information."'' 96 Noting that not all information can be disclosed
97
and that all details, even of a financial advisor's analysis, are not
required, 98 the Chancellor reaffirmed the materiality standard. 199  The
Chancellor emphasized that materiality is best demonstrated by a
comparative analysis showing how a set of supplemental disclosures
meaningfully altered the information previously available.200
Nevertheless, materiality analysis operates differently in Delaware
merger litigation from the way it operates in federal securities law cases.
First, courts decide Delaware merger cases on an expedited basis, according
to the lifecycle of the underlying transaction.20' If a case is not disposed of
through a motion during the pendency of the transaction, it will most likely
194. See, e.g., Lane v. Page, 649 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1289 (D.N.M. 2009) ("Omissions that
might ultimately be minor in a particular factual scenario, but which contravene an SEC
regulation... must satisfy causation requirements, preventing insubstantial violations of
disclosure requirements from becoming actionable claims for damages.").
195. In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. S'holders Litig., 65 A.3d 1116, 1127 (Del. Ch. 2011). Under
the federal definition, a disclosure is material if "the omitted fact would have been viewed by the
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available."
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
196. Transcript of Amylin Hearing, supra note 136, at 22.
197. Id. at 24.
198. Id. at25.
199. Id. at 28.
200. Id. at 30.
201. See Griffith & Lahav, supra note 15, at 1063-64 (explaining that both parties to merger
litigation will seek expedited processes because of the potential for a transaction delayed by
litigation to fall apart).
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be settled prior to the transaction's close so that the transacting parties can
eliminate it as a contingent liability.2 °2 This means that Chancery Court
judges reviewing merger disclosures always do so under substantial time
pressure, either in the context of a motion to dismiss or in the context of
approving a disclosure settlement. As a result, most of the court's rulings
on materiality come in the form of transcript opinions.0 3 Delaware's
release of transcript opinions seeks to strike a balance between efficiency of
time, on the one hand, and clarity of precedent, on the other. By contrast,
federal cases are more frequently litigated postclosing and can offer the
more formal, precedent-driven consideration of materiality described
above.204
Second, Delaware courts analyze the materiality of disclosures in
connection with the review and approval of settlements, a judicial act that is
typically, as we emphasized above, nonadversarial.2 °5  As a result,
defendants generally do not oppose and often tacitly support plaintiffs'
assertions concerning the materiality of disclosures.20 6 To put this into
context, the courts in Delaware are rarely faced with arguments on both
sides of questions such as whether a proffered supplemental disclosure is
largely duplicative of other information already disclosed to the market or is
insufficiently factual or too tentative to be useful. By contrast, federal
judges rule on materiality as a critical element establishing fraud.20 7 As a
result, the issue is fully briefed and argued by both sides to the dispute.
Hence, federal judges routinely receive better information in connection
with each materiality determination. When federal judges articulate the
basis of their materiality determination in formal judicial opinions, this
information produces a higher quality body of precedent that judges can
draw upon in future determinations. By contrast, unopposed settlements, as
even the Delaware judiciary acknowledges, make poor reference points.20 8
In addition, the structure of state court litigation claims creates an odd
bifurcation. The primary allegations of the complaint challenge the
merger's substantive and procedural fairness, typically encompassing
202. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
203. Griffith & Lahav, supra note 15, at 1125-26.
204. See supra subpart Ill(A).
205. See supra subpart t(B). In a minority of proceedings there are objectors, but these are
often pro se litigants, and their objections while noted do not interfere with the main settlement.
See Jeffries, supra note 10, at 59 ("[T]hese fee awards are rarely objected to and thus rarely
appealed.").
206. See Griffith & Lahav, supra note 15, at 1093 (discussing potential for agreement or
collusion between litigants seeking to win judicial approval of settlements).
207. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
208. See In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. S'holders Litig., 65 A.3d 1116, 1137 (Del. Ch. 2011) ("In
actuality, when reviewing an uncontested fee application, the Court suffers from an informational
vacuum created when the adversity of interests that drives the common law process dissipates.").
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possible conflicts of interest, failure to shop the company adequately or
otherwise maximize the sales price, or concerns about provisions in the
merger agreement such as termination fees. In contrast, the incidental
disclosure claims are generally not well developed in the complaint nor,
because they are incidental, are disclosure claims subjected to careful
scrutiny at the pleading stage pursuant to a motion to dismiss. What all of
this reveals, of course, is that state court litigation really is not about
disclosure.
Consider, for example, the Sauer-Danfoss complaint.20 9  Count III
alleges a breach of the defendants' fiduciary duty of disclosure in that "[t]he
Recommendation Statement fails to disclose material information,
including financial information and information necessary to prevent the
statements contained therein from being misleading., 210  The complaint
does not identify a single piece of omitted information as a basis for this
claim. Nor does the complaint identify a basis upon which the allegedly
omitted information was required to be disclosed. Simply put, the
allegations fall woefully short of the pleading standard that would be
required to file a federal claim under Rule 14a-9.21'
Most problematically, perhaps, the merits of the materiality question
are not squarely before the state court in merger litigation. State courts
address materiality not in connection with deciding fraud claims, but rather
in connection with approving negotiated settlements. In this context, the
court is not asked to decide whether the proxy would have been materially
misleading to investors without the supplemental disclosure but rather
whether a negotiated package of supplemental disclosures, once added to
the proxy statement, benefits shareholders. 212  Put in these terms, it is
difficult for a court to say that shareholders would not like to know an
additional piece of information, especially when there is no adverse party
briefing the court on why the additional information provides no real
benefit.213 Our empirical results, however, are fairly clear that supplemental
disclosures do not in fact change shareholder behavior and, in that sense at
least, provide no real benefit. The next subpart addresses what ought to be
done about it.
C. Eliminating the State Law Claim for Disclosure
Delaware courts provide a bounty for plaintiffs' lawyers to settle for
disclosure by requiring the defendant corporation to pay their fees. This
209. Sauer-Danfoss Complaint, supra note 32.
210. Id. para. 88, at 26.
211. See supra notes 189-93and accompanying text.
212. Griffith, supra note 47, at 22-25.
213. Id. at 21-22.
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bounty is based on the premise that disclosure-only settlements provide a
"substantial benefit" to the shareholder class. Our findings demonstrate that
this premise is misguided. The benefit produced by disclosure-only
settlements is anything but substantial. Indeed, it would be closer to the
truth to say that it is imaginary.
The cost of these suits, however, is very real. These suits generate
litigation costs-specifically the attorneys' fees on both the plaintiff and
defense sides-as well as court costs and the uncertainty and risk created by
subjecting every merger to litigation, often in multiple jurisdictions. 21 4 The
cases also may distort Delaware law, if the Delaware courts seek to
accommodate these claims and keep them from migrating to other
jurisdictions.215  Basic cost benefit analysis therefore suggests that
something ought to be done to significantly reduce these settlements. Our
suggestion is simple. We propose that Delaware stop recognizing
disclosure-only settlements as a substantial benefit for the purposes of a fee
award in class litigation involving public company mergers.216
Our rule would have the effect of eliminating the financing for
disclosure-only settlements, but only disclosure-only settlements, in state
court merger litigation. Our proposal explicitly recognizes that merger
litigation can produce substantial shareholder benefit-the Southern Peru
217
decision, for example, clearly shows that it can-and we do not limit the
right of shareholders to sue in connection with mergers. Nor do we seek to
address the scope of the duty of disclosure under state law.218
Delaware courts have been struggling for several years to accomplish a
similar outcome by more modest means-a searching and case-specific
inquiry into whether the supplemental disclosures are really
214. See Cain & Davidoff, supra note 6, at 3 (noting frequency of multijurisdictional
litigation).
215. See Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 495 (observing that Delaware courts tend to award
higher fees in cases that may be filed in multiple jurisdictions).
216. We confine our proposed rule to public company mergers because our empirical
evidence is limited to that context and also because the proxy rules regulate only publicly traded
companies. Delaware courts have recognized a difference between the disclosure obligations of
public and private companies in other contexts as well. Compare Skeen v. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc.,
750 A.2d 1170, 1174 (Del. 2000) (limiting disclosure obligations in an appraisal case involving a
publicly held corporation), with Erickson v. Centennial Beuregard Cellular LLC, No. Civ.A.
19974, 2003 WL 1878583, at *6-9 (Del. Ch. Apr. 11, 2003) (expanding disclosure obligations in
an appraisal case involving a privately held corporation and differentiating Skeen on the public-
private distinction).
217. In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S'holder Derivative Litig., 52 A.3d 761 (Del. Ch. 2011).
218. Others have questioned the utility of a state law duty of disclosure that differs from the
duties applicable under the federal securities laws. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 161, at 1577-
79 (advocating unification of the legal standard through SEC rule making adopting the Delaware
duty of disclosure).
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"meaningful.,, 219  Nevertheless, our empirical results suggest that the
inquiry in the context of the settlement approval decision is ineffective.
The vast majority of cases settled for supplemental disclosures-in which
the lawyers receive a nonzero fee award-appear to have no effect on the
shareholder vote. We can find no statistically significant relationship
between the amount of attorneys' fees awarded and the quality of the
resulting disclosure as measured by its effect on the shareholder vote.220 To
the extent that the courts are trying to award nominal fees in weak cases in
order to discourage nonmeritorious litigation, the practice does not seem to
be effective-litigation rates have been consistently increasing even as the
average fee award declines in size. It is simply implausible to explain the
growth in litigation challenges by a decline in the quality of merger
disclosures. Rather, existing doctrine, which treats a disclosure-only
settlement as providing shareholders with a substantial benefit, is creating
bad incentives.
D. Elimination of Disclosure-Only Fee Awards as Conceptual
Preemption
The obvious objection to our proposal is that by eliminating fee awards
in disclosure-only settlements we reduce the incentive for litigation in cases
in which the proxy statement is truly deficient. Moreover, removing the
threat of shareholder litigation in these cases might lead to an increase in
materially deficient disclosure by eliminating the deterrent effect of
disclosure claims. Barring disclosure settlements may open the door to
materially deficient disclosure.
Our proposal does not eliminate litigation challenges to merger
disclosure, however; it simply relegates those challenges to a highly
developed body of law and regulation and a forum specialized in applying
that law-litigation under the federal securities laws in federal courts.
Federal law is, as we explained, better designed to address merger
disclosure standards than Delaware's duty of disclosure, and federal courts
are well-situated to enforce that law efficiently. Delaware law and
Delaware courts, by contrast, are well-suited to pass on the substantive
fairness of merger transactions. We would reserve for state courts the
promulgation of legal standards for evaluating the substantive and
procedural fairness of mergers, and we would reserve for federal law the
regulation of merger disclosure.
Our proposal borrows from and extends the fundamental balance of
regulatory authority between Delaware, on the one hand, and the SEC, on
219. See supra subpart I(C).
220. See supra Table V.
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the other, as articulated by the United States Supreme Court in 1977. In
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, the Supreme Court considered a
challenge under Rule lOb-5 to a short-form merger pursuant to Delaware
law.221 The plaintiffs' claim was that the merger was fraudulent because it
222deprived plaintiffs of the fair value of their stock at an inadequate price.
The Court concluded that this allegation failed to state a claim under federal
law.223 Substantive fairness is not the same as deception, and the Court held
that federal law provides a remedy only for the latter.22 4 With respect to
substantive fairness, the Court stated that this was an issue for state
corporate law.225 The Court refused to federalize this body of law and
override state regulatory policies.226 The Court thus drew a line with
respect to the regulation of mergers: federal law would regulate disclosure
quality, and state law would address substantive fairness.227
The expansion of directors' disclosure duties under Delaware state law
encroaches upon the line articulated by the Court in Santa Fe. Concededly,
nothing in the Santa Fe decision or the federal securities laws precludes
states from imposing disclosure duties in connection with mergers that
supplement those imposed by federal law.228 But the broader message of
Santa Fe is a message about the balance of power and the specialization of
expertise. Indeed, the Court in Santa Fe explicitly noted that the plaintiffs
had an appraisal remedy available to them, which would have given them
the opportunity to have the Chancery Court conduct a valuation of their
stock, but that they had chosen not to pursue that remedy. 229  By
implication, the Court's decision was based in part on the existence and
perhaps superiority of state court as a forum for adjudicating claims about
merger fairness. Since Santa Fe, the Delaware Courts have developed
considerable expertise in understanding and applying complex principles of
221. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 464-65 (1977).
222. Id. at 467.
223. Id. at 479-80.
224. Id. at 475-76.
225. Id. at 478.
226. Id. at 478-79.
227. See id. at 478-80.
228. Indeed, the Exchange Act expressly preserves fights and remedies available under state
law, leaving room for federal and state disclosure regimes to exist side by side. See Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a)(2) (2012) ("[T]he rights and remedies
provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist
at law or in equity."). But see 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1) (preempting state court litigation for
"covered class actions").
229. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 466-67.
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valuation, 23 as well as in analyzing the procedures by which mergers and
other control transactions are conducted and negotiated. 23'
In contrast, the federal courts have developed expertise both in
evaluating disclosure quality and in evaluating the quality of litigation
challenging that disclosure. This expertise is enhanced within the subject of
merger disclosure because the substantive content of a proxy statement in
connection with a shareholder vote on a merger is largely determined by the
SEC's disclosure requirements. Thus the federal courts' analyses of
disclosure challenges are informed by the choices that the SEC has made in
formulating affirmative disclosure requirements and balancing those
requirements against competing values. This makes the federal courts
particularly well-suited to evaluate the extent to which supplemental
disclosures add material value to the information provided in a specific
proxy statement.
We argue here that the Delaware courts should follow a similar
approach to that taken by the Supreme Court in Santa Fe and restore the
conceptual boundary between state and federal regulation. We propose that
the courts conclude that claims about the adequacy of merger disclosure
should be litigated under federal law (and subject to the materiality
threshold established therein), leaving state law to focus on the fairness,
both procedural and substantive, of the merger terms.
Our proposal locates merger litigation within the space in which
federal and state law potentially overlap and in which both Wilmington and
Washington should consider the possibility of upsetting a "well-tuned
balance" through greater regulatory intervention.232 Federal and state law
take very different approaches to the regulation of mergers and, in the same
manner that the Supreme Court has recognized the superiority of state
mechanisms for evaluating substantive merger fairness, state courts might
do well to rethink the intrusion into disclosure duties.
IV. Objections and Responses
A. Multiforum Litigation
The core objection to our proposal may be that the hands of the
Delaware courts are tied. While they might prefer to refuse to award
attorneys' fees in disclosure-only settlements, they face a real risk that, in
doing so, they will drive merger litigation outside of Delaware and into
230. See, e.g., In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 16415, 2004 WL
1305745, at *12-28 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004).
231. See, e.g., Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1239, 1244-49 (Del. 2012).
232. Mark J. Roe, Delaware and Washington as Corporate Lawmakers, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L.
1, 16 (2009).
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other states in which the judges subject proposed settlements to lower levels
of scrutiny.233 Recall that not only has the percentage of mergers facing a
litigation challenge risen, but that mergers today typically face multiple
litigation challenges in different fora. If Delaware courts do not pay
plaintiffs' lawyers, they will file and settle their cases elsewhere.234 Indeed
there is evidence that litigants have done precisely that, engaging in forum
shopping and then, on occasion, entering into reverse auctions in which
they agree to settle cases for limited value as long as they receive a fee
award.235
While it may be that forum shopping has thus far limited the ability of
Delaware to reduce the volume of low-value merger litigation, since the
judicial acceptance of forum-selection bylaws, however, the problems
associated with multiforum litigation have entered a new phase.236 Forum-
selection bylaws allow a corporation to select, in advance, Delaware court
as the exclusive forum for corporate governance disputes.237 The bylaws
238are expressly intended to apply to merger litigation. Hence, a corporation
can effectively opt in to the Delaware approach to merger litigation by
adopting a forum-selection bylaw, and, provided that the out-of-state court
likewise defers to the bylaw provision, Delaware law will be applied by
Delaware courts.239
233. See, e.g., John Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STuD. 605, 634 (2012) (suggesting that courts in other states will scrutinize proposed settlements
and fee awards less carefully); Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 484-85 (discussing problems
presented by multijurisdictional litigation).
234. See John Armour et al., Delaware's Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J. 1345, 1370-72 (2012)
(explaining that Delaware's historical approach to attorneys' fees has been "widely believed to be
more generous" but that fee cuts could lead to more out-of-Delaware litigation); Cain & Davidoff,
supra note 4, at 496 ("[S]tate courts compete for litigation and attorneys respond rationally to the
incentives provided by settlements .... and ... fee awards themselves."); Griffith & Lahav, supra
note 15, at 1066-70 (examining a trend of cases moving out of Delaware).
235. See Brief of Special Counsel, supra note 79, at 7 (discussing the danger that counsel will
settle for too low an amount in order to secure a fee in a reverse auction situation); John C. Coffee,
Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1370,
1372-73 (1995) (explaining how forum shopping can lead to reverse auctions).
236. See, e.g., Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 942, 963
(Del. Ch. 2013) (concluding that such bylaws were facially valid under the statute as applied to
cases arising under the internal affairs doctrine).
237. See id. at 951-52 (explaining that forum-selection bylaws regulate where stockholders
may file suit).
238. Id.
239. Cf City of Providence v. First Citizens BancShares, Inc., No. 9795-CB, 2014 WL
4409816, at * 1, *5, * 11 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2014) (deferring to a forum-selection bylaw in favor of
North Carolina). But see Roberts v. Triquint Semiconductor, Inc., No. 1402-02441, slip op. at 9
(Ore. Cir. Ct. Aug. 14, 2014) (refusing to defer to forum-selection bylaw in favor of Delaware).
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We note that we do not, in this Article, address the question of whether
or to what extent courts should defer to forum-selection clauses.24 °
Nonetheless, to the extent that courts accept such clauses, they enable our
proposed rule to operate as a form of private ordering. Were our proposal
to be enacted, shareholders of corporations that adopted forum-selection
bylaws would effectively be opting into a rule that barred the funding of
disclosure settlements from the corporate treasury. By contrast,
shareholders of corporations that did not adopt forum-selection bylaws
would effectively be electing to keep open the possibility of paying for a
disclosure settlement in an alternative jurisdiction.24' Were Delaware to
choose the clear rule we propose over its current haphazard approach,
shareholders could decide for themselves, via the mechanics of forum-
selection clauses, which rule was optimal for them.
Notably, even if other states do not uniformly defer to forum-selection
provisions,242 the cases that our proposal would exclude from the Delaware
courts are the weakest243-those in which the Delaware courts have the
least interest in channeling deal makers' conduct by critiquing the actions of
the parties who are brought before them.244 As some commentators have
observed, these critiques and exhortations are as vital to the development of
Delaware law as the holdings themselves because they guide the conduct of
transaction planners in future cases.245 We suggest, however, that the
Delaware courts can perform these "teaching moments" most effectively
not in the cases that settle for disclosures and small attorneys' fee awards
but rather those that, like El Paso and Del Monte, produce substantial
240. See generally ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 560 (Del. 2014)
(suggesting deference in the context of a loser-pays bylaw).
241. This assumes, of course, that the alternative jurisdiction does not itself have a rule
barring the payment of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees for disclosure settlements, an assumption that
may not be warranted for every jurisdiction. See infra notes 272-77.
242. See supra note 239.
243. The message courts appear to be sending in many of these disclosure-only cases is that
the plaintiffs' bar should stop bringing such weak cases. See, e.g., In re PAETEC Holding Corp.
S'holders Litig., No. 6761-VCG, 2013 WL 1110811, at *6 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 2013) (stressing
that close judicial scrutiny is warranted, especially "in the context of merger litigation that
produces a disclosure-only settlement"). The effect appears to be limited though given the
continued high rate of litigation.
244. A good recent example of such an opinion is In re El Paso Corp. Shareholder Litigation,
in which Chancellor Strine declined to enjoin the merger but excoriated the conduct of the parties
involved. 41 A.3d 432, 434-35 (Del. Ch. 2012). Because the court did not issue an injunction,
the opinion is technically all dicta, but the critique of the parties' conduct gives transaction
planners a clear sense of what to avoid in future deals.
245. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law
Work?, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1009, 1097-99 (1997) (remarking that shareholder litigation plays a
beneficial role in the creation of corporate norms).
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damage awards and attorneys' fees.246 As a result, our proposal should not
affect the pedagogical content of Delaware law in any meaningful way and
instead sends a message to plaintiffs' counsel to concentrate their efforts on
the most problematic cases.
An alternative to the use of forum-selection bylaws would be for the
Delaware courts to adopt the restriction on attorneys' fee awards in
disclosure-only cases as a part of Delaware's substantive corporate law. As
a substantive rule, this limitation would preclude other state or federal
courts from awarding fees in these cases under Erie247 and the internal
affairs doctrine. We note that a substantive law approach would have the
salutary effect of preserving the incentive for Delaware courts to continue
their leadership role by maintaining the potential for competition with
respect to the "good" merger cases.
B. The Litigation Response to Barring Disclosure-Only Fee Awards
We have focused in this Article on the incentive effect of settlement-
only fee awards. We recognize, however, that our proposal creates an
alternative set of incentives that may, in turn, impact future merger
litigation. Possible such effects include: (1) reducing merger litigation to
the point that it allows bad deals to proceed unchallenged; (2) creating
negative spillover effects in other forms of corporate litigation, such as
appraisal actions; and (3) shifting to an alternative type of low value
settlements in merger litigation. We address each of these in turn.
One challenge to our proposal is that it would undercut what is often
seen as the basic value of merger litigation-that is, its ability to serve as a
screen for deal quality. According to this view, the real purpose of merger
litigation is to identify and prevent bad deals from being consummated.
However, because litigants cannot necessarily evaluate deal quality until the
case gets into discovery-Del Monte is an example of a transaction that did
not show its flaws until shareholder claimants reached discovery 248 -
merger litigation must be overinclusive at the filing stage in order to get
potentially good cases into discovery. Hence, the argument goes, our
proposal inhibits the screening function of merger litigation because it is
likely to result either in fewer claims being brought or in fewer claims being
246. The settlement amount in El Paso was $110 million (with $26 million going to legal fees
and expenses), while the settlement amount in Del Monte was $89.4 million (with $23.3 million
going to legal fees and expenses). El Paso, 2012 WL 6057331, at *para. 19; Stipulation and
Agreement of Settlement at 10, El Paso, 41 A.3d 432 (No. 6949-CS); Del Monte Transcript, supra
note 50, at 53, 58.
247. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
248. See In re Del Monte Foods Co. S'holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 817 (Del. Ch. 2011)
(noting that "[d]iscovery revealed a deeper problem" with the sale process).
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pursued with any real vigor. Because fewer claims are being pursued, the
screening function of merger litigation may not function optimally-that is,
it may allow bad deals to proceed unchallenged.
First, we acknowledge that our proposal is likely to lead to a reduction
in merger litigation overall. This is because the inability to win fees for
disclosure settlements will reduce the profitability of merger litigation for
plaintiffs' firms on a portfolio basis, creating an incentive to curtail claims
activity. This is not necessarily a bad thing. Indeed, in light of the ubiquity
of litigation challenges to mergers, we view this as a virtue of our
proposal.249  What we are advocating simply is a return to the state of
merger litigation circa 2003 before the current litigation explosion. In that
year, 25 cases were brought or approximately 28.7% of deals using the
same sample criteria that we use in this Article. ° We have little reason to
believe that this level of litigation exposure was insufficient to deter
misconduct.
In addition, the Delaware courts can offset the effect of our proposal
completely by simply paying higher attorneys' fees for meritorious cases.
Tailoring the fee award more closely to case quality would provide more
appropriate incentives than paying counsel a nominal fee in every case, no
matter how weak. In contrast, current law seems to encourage plaintiffs'
firms to bring weak cases in the hope of winning fees for supplemental
disclosures. We would be happy if our proposal resulted in these claims not
being brought.
Moreover, a reduction in claims activity is problematic only if good
claims and bad claims are equally deterred-in other words, that it is
impossible to identify good and bad cases early in the process. We doubt
the accuracy of this proposition. There are strong reasons to believe that
plaintiffs' firms are able to screen for case quality early in the litigation
process and to expend their resources in the highest quality cases.
Litigation experience under the federal securities laws subsequent to the
adoption of the PSLRA strongly suggests both that plaintiffs' lawyers
respond to incentives and that, when the law structures incentives to reward
only high quality cases, plaintiffs' lawyers respond.5
249. See supra Part III.
250. This number is derived from unreported statistics used in our data compilation for
another paper coauthored by one of the authors. C.N.V. Krishnan, Steven Davidoff Solomon &
Randall S. Thomas, Zealous Advocates or Self-Interested Actors? Assessing the Value of
Plaintiffs' Law Firms in Merger Litigation (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ., Working
Paper No. 14-25, 2014), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=2490098,
archived at http://perma.cc/G26B-EMEX.
251. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598, 622-23 (2007) (empirically testing the effect
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Alternatively, a ban on fee awards in disclosure-only settlements might
lead plaintiffs' counsel to shift the nature of the cases they file. One
possibility is a shift from fiduciary duty claims to appraisal proceedings. At
least one empirical study has found that investors are making growing use
of the appraisal remedy2 52 and, at least in some cases, recovering
substantially more than the merger consideration.253
To the extent our proposal generates a shift to appraisal proceedings,
we would view that shift as an unmitigated benefit for two reasons. First,
the Delaware courts are experts in valuation methodology and continue to
refine the appraisal proceeding to modernize the mechanism for
shareholders to challenge merger price. Second, appraisal focuses directly
on the issue that is most central to a merger challenge-are shareholders
receiving fair value for their stock?254  At the end of the day, whatever
disclosure or process issues are involved, the primary issue from a
shareholder perspective is the merger price.255 By focusing exclusively on
that question, we view appraisal as the optimal method for providing
shareholders with redress. Indeed, as the Delaware courts have explained,
the appraisal proceeding may provide shareholders with a better remedy
than the standard fiduciary duty claim if the true concern is merger
consideration because an appraisal proceeding requires a judicial
determination of fair value, while a court will reject a fiduciary duty claim
so long as the merger price is "within the range of fairness. 256  The
difference is illustrated by the Cede & Co. v. Technicolor257 litigation, in
which the court determined, in ruling on a breach of fiduciary duty claim,
that the merger consideration of $23/share was fair,258 yet in an appraisal
proceeding awarded the plaintiffs $28.41/share. 259 Accordingly, we view
the appraisal proceeding as creating appropriate litigation incentives for
of PSLRA on filing decisions by plaintiffs' attorneys and finding significant effect on the choice
of cases filed).
252. See Minor Myers & Charles R. Korsmo, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public
Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 14-18) (documenting a
large increase in appraisal activity), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-2424935.
253. See id. (manuscript at 36 tbl.3) (showing the mean amount allocated to shareholder to be
much greater with "all appraisal" than with "no appraisal").
254. Id. (manuscript at 1); see also In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 35 (Del. Ch.
2013) ("The appraisal proceeding seeks a statutory determination of fair value .... ).
255. See Trados, 73 A.3d at 78 (finding no breach of fiduciary duty where merger price was
determined to be fair).
256. Id.
257. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 884 A.2d 26 (Del. 2005).
258. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor 111), 663 A.2d 1156, 1176-77 (Del.
1995).
259. Cede, 884 A.2d at 30.
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both shareholders and their counsel to bring challenges if and only if they
have a reasonable chance of recovering additional consideration.
A third possible concern is that our proposal eliminates only one
pathway to wasteful settlement while leaving several others, notably
amendment settlements and securities claims, completely unaffected. The
predictable result of this change, then, is that litigants with weak claims will
seek to channel their rent-seeking efforts along these other paths, seeking
fees in exchange for meaningless amendments to the merger agreement or,
alternatively, seeking to conclude a meaningless disclosure settlement of
their securities claim.
Our first response is that we should not allow the perfect to become the
enemy of the good. If disclosure-only settlements do not benefit
shareholders, they should not be incentivized. This conclusion holds
regardless if our proposal does not, at the same time, eliminate other
opportunities for rent-seeking by plaintiffs' lawyers. Our second response
is to question the extent to which these alternatives provide effective
substitutes for disclosure-only settlements. We have reasons to think they
do not.
At first glance, amendment settlements seem to be the most promising
alternative pathway for plaintiffs' lawyers' rent-seeking efforts. It may be
possible for plaintiffs' lawyers to negotiate very small modifications to the
merger agreement and then to argue that these modifications benefit the
shareholder class. Indeed, this happens today. Studies find that many
common merger-agreement amendments involve modest changes to deal
protections, such as a slightly longer go-shop period or a slightly smaller
termination fee, generally with no observable effect, such as the subsequent
appearance of an intervening bidder.260 Such changes might become more
common were our proposal to be implemented. Moreover, to prevent such
amendments from disturbing their bargain, transacting parties could
anticipate them in the terms of the original agreement by agreeing to a
shorter go-shop period or a higher termination fee at the outset.
While some such behavior may take place, we believe it is generally
far less easy to settle for an amendment to the merger agreement than to
settle for supplemental disclosures. Our empirical results clearly support
this view-in our sample, 13.60% of settlements are amendment
settlements while 80.10% are disclosure-only settlements. One explanation
is that before plaintiffs' lawyers and the target company can agree to amend
the merger agreement, they must get the approval of a significant party at
interest-namely, the acquiring company. By this point in the process, the
260. See RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION, supra note 37, at 10
(listing termination fees as a common amendment); Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 479 (same).
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acquiring company will have invested considerable effort and expense in
the merger agreement and, having achieved agreement, will likely be loath
to alter it. In addition, even if the amendments are minor, the acquiring
party arguably has something meaningful to lose from them, leading the
settlement negotiation to be more adversarial in nature. Simply put, the
involvement of a third party with something to lose in the transaction
inhibits collusion between the plaintiffs' attorney and the defendant.261 In
contrast, the negotiation of a disclosure settlement involves only the
plaintiffs' lawyers and the target corporation, enabling low-value
disclosures to be traded more freely.262
Furthermore, should the involvement of the counterparty to the merger
agreement not be sufficient to prevent litigants from concluding low-value
amendment settlements, the Delaware courts could once again become
involved. Chancery Court judges have a comparative advantage in
evaluating merger agreements generally and deal-protection provisions in
particular. There is a large and well-developed body of substantive
jurisprudence on the gamut of deal-protection devices-from poison pills
and crown-jewel lockups to termination fees and no-talk or no-shop
provisions.263 The judges of the Chancery Court regularly evaluate how a
given provision affected a particular deal and would be especially well-
suited to determine whether a given amendment produced substantial
benefit to the shareholder class.26
The other obvious litigation alternative is for plaintiffs' lawyers to file
disclosure claims under the federal securities laws and to resolve those
claims through disclosure-only settlements. As noted earlier, we do not
view this alternative as problematic, largely because of the existing body of
procedural and substantive requirements designed to limit the potential for
261. The acquiring company is unlikely to go along with whatever the target company and the
shareholders' lawyers suggest, potentially viewing the suggested amendments as negotiating
gambits and insisting instead upon the deal as agreed.
262. It is true that insofar as the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees are paid by directors and officers
(D&O) insurance, as indeed they typically are, there is theoretically a third party at the table-
namely, the D&O insurers-who could constrain the ability of plaintiffs and defendants to
collude, much as the acquiring company would constrain the parties in the context of an
amendment settlement. That the D&O insurer frequently does not live up to this role, however, is
well documented. See TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT:
How LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 138-41 (2010) (discussing
the constraints on D&O insurers' authority and influence over settlements).
263. See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 933-36 (Del. 2003)
(evaluating multiple deal-protection devices); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (analyzing the use of a lock-up agreement).
264. See, e.g., In re Compellent Techs., Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 6084-VCL, 2011 WL
6382523, at *18-26 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2011) (evaluating the benefit conferred to shareholders by
modification of the deal protections in a merger agreement).
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frivolous litigation.265 Substantively, a federal cause of action is more
limited than a state law duty-of-disclosure claim, both because of the
threshold materiality analysis and because of the fact that omissions are
actionable only in the context of an affirmative duty to disclose. As we
have noted, federal courts have developed expertise in the application of
these legal standards.266 Procedurally, the pleading standard of the PSLRA
requires plaintiffs to identify specific misstatements and omissions at the
outset rather than filing a boilerplate claim of inadequate disclosure, and the
discovery stay prohibits plaintiffs from using the cost of discovery as
leverage to induce a settlement.267 Studies suggest that the federal courts
have been diligent in applying these standards to dismiss weak disclosure
claims at an early stage.
268
V. A Roadmap to Implementation
Having laid out our proposal, we briefly consider possible methods of
implementation. Because of Delaware's leadership role in corporate
litigation, and because of the high percentage of merger targets that are
incorporated in Delaware, we look to Delaware to set the standard. We
believe that the likely proliferation of forum-selection bylaws will enhance
Delaware's ability to do so. We note, however, that our proposal is
available to other states and, indeed, that the state of Texas has adopted an
approach that is analogous to what we suggest, albeit not focused
specifically on the context of merger litigation.269
Perhaps the most straightforward approach for eliminating fee awards
in disclosure-only settlements would be for courts to stop recognizing
disclosure-only settlements as producing a shareholder benefit sufficient to
entitle plaintiffs' lawyers to a fee award. Because the corporate benefit
270doctrine is a judicially created doctrine, courts could implement this
change themselves. We note that some Delaware judges seem to be moving
in this direction on a case-specific basis. However, we recognize that
judges are accustomed to applying discretion on a case-by-case basis and
generally prefer rules that preserve rather than restrict their discretion. As a
265. See supra notes 189-94 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 189-94 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 189-94 and accompanying text.
268. See, e.g., Michael Klausner et al., When Are Securities Class Actions Dismissed, When
Do They Settle, andfor How Much?-An Update, PLUS J., Apr. 2013, at 1, 8 (reporting, based on
a study of all securities class actions filed between 2006 and 2010, that "38% of cases ended
relatively quickly and painlessly for the defendants").
269. See infra notes 272-76 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
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result, the courts may be unwilling to adopt a per se rule that binds their
own hands.27'
An alternative would be for the courts, again as a matter of common
law, to cut back on the breadth of the substantive duty of disclosure. As we
noted earlier, the Delaware duty of disclosure is of relatively recent origin,
arguably broader than the federal law course of action, and somewhat
imperfectly articulated because of the procedural context in which it is most
frequently applied. We suspect that the emergence of the duty of disclosure
and the articulation by several courts of broad disclosure obligations,
particularly with respect to the work and incentives of investment bankers
in connection with control transactions, has contributed to the proliferation
of merger litigation, especially because, under the existing obligation,
disclosure challenges cannot readily be resolved on a motion to dismiss. A
substantive change to Delaware fiduciary duty law is a more ambitious
response than our proposal requires, but it would be an effective solution as
well. Notably, a modification to the substantive duty of disclosure would
reduce the ability of plaintiffs to evade the change through forum shopping.
A third option would be for the Delaware legislature to adopt our
proposed solution. The most straightforward mechanism would be a statute
that bars the award of attorneys' fees in disclosure-only settlements of
merger litigation. As an example of such an action, the Texas Legislature
recently instructed the Texas Supreme Court to amend the rules of civil
procedure to prohibit the award of cash attorneys' fees in class actions that
are settled for coupons or other nonpecuniary benefits, a rule that goes
farther than our own proposal.272 A recent decision of the Texas Court of
Appeals, Kazman,2 7 3 held that this provision precluded the trial court from
awarding monetary fees to class counsel in connection with a proposed
disclosure-only merger settlement.274
An important distinction between the Texas provision and our proposal
is that the Texas legislation is not confined to merger cases.275  The
motivation for the Texas law was a concern about coupon settlements in
271. On the other hand, members of the Chancery Court might be relieved not to have to
wade into the morass of fee disputes for what is now a large category of cases. See Daniel Fisher,
Delaware Judge Strine: 'I'm Not Going to Give Big Fees for Junk,' FORBES (Oct. 24, 2012,
3:10 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2012/10/24/delaware-judge-strine-im-not-
going-to-give-big-fees-for-junk/, archived at http://perma.cc/F3KQ-P739 (quoting Chancellor
Strine as stating "I'm not going to give big fees for junk" and that "[w]hat does trouble me is the
hundreds and hundreds of lawsuits where the only beneficiary is the trial lawyer").
272. Act of June 11,2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 1.01, secs. 26.001-002, 2003 Tex. Gen.
Laws 847, 847-48 (codified at Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 26.001-.003 (West 2014)).
273. Kazman v. Frontier Oil Corp., 398 S.W.3d 377 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2013,
no pet.).
274. Id. at 387.
275. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 26.001-003 (West 2014).
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class litigation generally.276  This concern has been raised in other
substantive contexts such as consumer and antitrust class actions. 77 Yet
from a political-economy perspective, enacting merger-specific legislation
is a logical approach for Delaware given its interests in protecting target
corporations incorporated within the state from unfounded and excessive
litigation challenges. 278 Delaware also benefits by removing unnecessary
obstacles to the merger of Delaware corporations because such an action
increases the expected value of corporations incorporated in the state.279
A deeper question occasioned by our proposal is whether Delaware
will willingly cede some of the authority it now possesses in merger
regulation to federal courts. Our proposal would have the effect of making
federal courts, rather than Delaware, the central authority for evaluating the
quality of disclosures in public company mergers. 280  Ceding this role
would go against the state's seeming incentive to maximize its authority
over businesses incorporated within the state. 8' We argue that our
empirical findings provide convincing evidence that the power conferred on
the Delaware courts by ubiquitous and weak merger litigation challenges is
illusory. The cases resolved through disclosure-only settlements do not
276. See Michael Northrup, Restrictions on Class-Action Attorney-Fee Awards, 46 S. TEx. L.
REv. 953, 961 (2005) ("The adoption of the coupon rule evidences the legislature's dissatisfaction
with the practice of leveraging the class-action device into settlements that provide insignificant
recoveries (or effectively no recovery) to class members, while the class attorneys recover large
cash awards.").
277. James Tharin & Brian Blockovich, Coupons and the Class Action Fairness Act, 18 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 1443, 1445-47 (2005); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1172(d) (2012) (barring coupon
settlements without court approval).
278. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 8-9 (1993)
(describing political-economy reasons for the Delaware legislature's responsiveness to corporate
interests). Delaware derived $534,236,586 in revenue in 2008 from fees paid by corporations and
other business associations. Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Shrinking Half-Life, 62 STAN. L. REv. 125,
136 tbl.3 (2009).
279. See Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525,
527-28 (2001) (hypothesizing that the value of Delaware firms reflect, in part, their amenability to
a takeover under a balanced regulatory regime).
280. This would encompass a reallocation of authority to the federal government after a long
period of acquiescence. Steven M. Davidoff, The SEC and the Failure of Federal Takeover
Regulation, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 211, 269 (2007).
281. See Steven M. Davidoff, A Case Study: Air Products v. Airgas and the Value of Strategic
Judicial Decision-Making, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 502, 505-06 (2012) (positing that Airgas
provides insight into how Delaware courts seek to maximize Delaware's dominance); Sean J.
Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence,
55 DUKE L.J. 1, 55 (2005) (recognizing the direct threat, imposed by the possibility of corporate
migration, to Delaware's revenue as a likely reason for the legislature's responsiveness to
corporate suggestion); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How to Prevent Hard Cases from Making
Bad Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware and the Strategic Use of Comity, 58 EMORY L.J. 713, 714-15
(2009) (noting Delaware's immense financial success as a result of its control of corporate
lawmaking).
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provide the Delaware courts with a meaningful role in implementing merger
standards. Freeing the courts from these cases would empower the courts to
do what they do best-deciding real cases and setting substantive and
procedural standards that matter from the perspective of business practices
and shareholder value.
Conclusion
We have examined the value of nonpecuniary relief in merger
litigation from a heretofore neglected angle-its effect on shareholder
voting. We find that amendment settlements have some demonstrable
effect on shareholder voting but that disclosure-only settlements do not.
The clear implication of these findings is that disclosure-only settlements
do not produce a corporate benefit.
Because disclosure-only settlements produce costs but no benefits, we
argue that they should be eliminated. An easy way to accomplish this is
removing the judicially created incentive for plaintiffs' attorneys to bring
these cases by rejecting the claim that a disclosure-only settlement is a
corporate benefit for purposes of Delaware law. This approach would not
leave shareholders without recourse if merger disclosures are materially
deficient; instead they would be required to litigate true disclosure claims
under the federal securities laws, preserving state merger litigation for
challenges to the substantive and procedural fairness of the merger terms.
The effect of adopting this policy would be to eliminate much wasteful
litigation while still preserving the ability of Delaware courts to decide
more substantial challenges to deals.
20151
Texas Law Review
Appendix
Table III (All Variables)
Table III reports ordinary least squares regressions in which the
dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is % Yes Votes Per Votes Cast;
columns (3) and (4) is % Yes Votes Per Outstanding Shares; and columns
(5) and (6) are % Yes Votes Per All Yes & No Votes. % Yes Votes Per Votes
Cast is the percentage of yes votes out of all votes cast at the meeting,
including abstentions. % Yes Votes Per Outstanding Shares is the
percentage of yes votes out of the total outstanding voting shares of the
target and eligible to vote as of the record date for the meeting. % Yes
Votes Per All Yes & No Votes is the percentage of yes votes out of the total
number of yes and no votes cast at the meeting. The sample is as described
in subpart II(A), infra. Initial Offer Premium is the initial offer price over
target's trading price thirty days prior to merger announcement. Final Offer
Premium is the final price paid over target's trading price thirty days prior
to announcement. Cash indicates the consideration paid is all cash, Auction
indicates the transaction is initiated as an auction among multiple bidders
instead of a privately-negotiated sale, Go shop indicates that the merger
agreement includes a provision that allows the target company to actively
solicit other potential bidders for a specific limited period of time after the
merger agreement has been signed, Take Private indicates that a Schedule
13E-3 has been filed with the SEC for the transaction due to the buyer
being an affiliated party. ISS Position = 0 means ISS recommended that its'
client shareholders do not vote or vote against the transactions. ISS
Position = 1 means that ISS recommended that its client shareholders vote
for the transaction. Appraisal Exercise = 1 if any shareholder exercised
appraisal rights and = 0 otherwise. Disclosure Settlement requires the target
to make an additional disclosure concerning the transaction; Consideration-
Increase Settlement provides for an increase in the consideration payable to
target shareholders; and Amendment Settlement requires the terms of the
transaction to be revised. Amendment Settlement also includes settlements
that have as a component a Disclosure Settlement. Consideration-Increase
Settlement also includes settlements that have as a component Amendment
or Disclosure Settlements. Supermajority State = 1 if the state of
incorporation of the target requires greater than 50% of shareholders to
approve a merger and = 0 otherwise. P-values are in parentheses, with ***,
**, and * denoting statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. The models in columns (1), (3), and (5) include only targets
incorporated in Delaware and where the acquisition is all cash. All models
include year-fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses, with ***, **, and *
denoting statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
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Table IV (All Variables)
Table IV reports ordinary least squares regressions in which the
dependent variable in columns (1) & (2) is % Yes Votes Per Votes Cast;
columns (3) and (4) is % Yes Votes Per Outstanding Shares; and columns
(5) and (6) are % Yes Votes Per All Yes & No Votes. % Yes Votes Per Votes
Cast is the percentage of yes votes out of all votes cast at the meeting,
including abstentions. Attorneys Fee > 500 is coded = I if the attorneys'
fees awarded in the litigation are greater than $500,000 and = 0 if the
attorneys' fees awarded are less than $500,000. Attorney Fees (Log) is the
log value of the attorneys' fees awarded in the settlement. All other
variables are as defined in Table III(A). All models include year-fixed
effects. P-values are in parentheses, with ***, **, and * denoting statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table V (All Variables)
Table V reports ordinary least squares regressions in which the
dependent variable in columns (1) & (2) is % Yes Votes Per Votes Cast;
columns (3) and (4) is % Yes Votes Per Outstanding Shares; and columns
(5) & (6) are % Yes Votes Per All Yes & No Votes. % Yes Votes Per Votes
Cast is the percentage of yes votes out of all votes cast at the meeting,
including abstentions. Columns (1)-(4) include all transactions in the
sample, and columns (5) and (6) include only mergers with a transaction
value less than $500 million. Institutional Ownership % is the percentage
of total institutional ownership. Top 5 Institutional Ownership is the
percentage ownership of the largest five institutional owners. Top 10
Institutional Ownership is the percentage ownership of the largest ten
institutional owners. Maximum Institutional Ownership is the percentage
ownership of the largest institutional owner. Institutional ownership for
each of these variables is as of the quarter end immediately prior to the
shareholder meeting date. All other variables are as defined in Table III(A).
All models include year-fixed effects. P-values are in parentheses, with
***, **, and * denoting statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.
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